The Case for Writing International Law into the U.S. Code by Coyle, John F.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 2 Article 2
3-30-2015
The Case for Writing International Law into the
U.S. Code
John F. Coyle
University of North Carolina Law School, jfcoyle@email.unc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the International Law Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the
Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation




THE CASE FOR WRITING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW INTO THE U.S. CODE 
JOHN F. COYLE* 
Abstract: In recent years, the U.S. judiciary has taken steps to limit the role 
played by international law in the U.S. legal system. This Article seeks to ex-
plain this retreat and to identify ways by which it may be reversed. It argues 
first that the present judicial retreat from international law is attributable to 
two causes: judicial attitudes and judicial inexperience. Many judges have ex-
pressed some degree of ambivalence—occasionally rising to the level of hos-
tility—about relying upon international law to provide a rule of decision. At 
the same time, many judges are largely unfamiliar with an ever-expanding ar-
ray of international legal sources and methods. This Article contends that the 
end result of this combination of attitudes and inexperience is a pronounced 
reluctance among U.S. judges to give direct effect to certain types of interna-
tional law. To date, many international legal scholars have responded to these 
developments by attempting to persuade the judiciary to rethink its basic ap-
proach to international law. This Article argues that a more promising ap-
proach would be to seek to persuade the other two branches of the federal 
government to enact domestic statutes that incorporate various international 
law rules. These statutory enactments would, among other things, enable the 
courts to ignore many of the doctrinal impediments that currently make it dif-
ficult for individuals to rely directly on international law as a source of rights. 
They would have a positive impact on the attitudes of skeptical judges. And 
they would help to alleviate the problem of judicial inexperience. With these 
goals in mind, the Article offers a number of practical suggestions as to how 
to draft statutes that incorporate international law so as to maximize the likeli-
hood that such statutes—and the international law rules incorporated there-
in—will be given their full effect by U.S. courts. 
INTRODUCTION 
The overwhelming majority of international law is today—and has 
long been—enforced in national courts.1 In the United States, courts are 
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regularly called upon to give effect to treaties relating to the liability of air 
carriers, the enforceability of international sales contracts, and the protec-
tion of intellectual property, among other areas.2 These courts also occa-
sionally hear cases involving the application of customary international 
law.3 Over the past few decades, however, the judiciary has taken steps to 
limit the direct role played by international law in the U.S. legal system.4 In 
a number of recent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has evinced what one 
commentator describes as a “visceral resistance to treating modern interna-
tional law in both treaty and customary form as law of the United States.”5 
Similarly, the federal courts of appeal have exhibited a marked reluctance to 
give direct effect to customary international law or treaties to which the 
United States has long been a party.6 
                                                                                                                           
 1 JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 5 (1999) (“[I]nternational law is most commonly applied 
by judges in their own national courts . . . .”); ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 8 (2011) (“The volume of national case-law on . . . matters of 
international law easily outnumbers the decisions of international courts and tribunals.”). 
 2 See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 646 (2004) (international air carrier 
liability); Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp. L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 1109 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (international sales contracts); ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 156 (2d Cir. 
2007) (international trademarks). 
 3 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735–38 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876, 884–85 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2014). Cus-
tomary international law is that law resulting from “a general and consistent practice of states 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987). 
 4  See Oona A. Hathaway et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. 
Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 90 (2012) (“The courts of the United States are today less willing 
than at any previous time in history to directly enforce the Article II treaty obligations of the Unit-
ed States through a private right of action.”). 
 5 Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Weakening of Precedent: A Long Walk for a Short 
Drink, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 841, 845 (2013) (stating further that “[b]oth the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts have opted to minimize the authority of much of international law by deploying existing 
doctrine in an aggressive and unprecedented way”); see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. 
Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (invoking presumption against extraterritoriality to bar certain international 
law claims under the Alien Tort Statute); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008) (an-
nouncing a new presumption against reading treaties to provide a right of action in domestic litiga-
tion); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712–24 (narrowing scope of customary international law norms actionable 
under the Alien Tort Statute). 
 6 Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 159 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing that “there is a strong 
presumption against inferring individual rights from international treaties” (internal citations omit-
ted)); Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not create private rights that may be enforced by 
individuals in U.S. courts); Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 485 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (concluding that “the Paris Convention creates [no] substantive rights beyond those 
independently provided in the Lanham Act”); Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 201 (D. Mass. 
2004) (“The United States has at times demonstrated a certain unwillingness to permit internation-
al law to decide domestic disputes. In particular, American courts have often been reluctant to 
apply customary international law . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
2015] Writing International Law into the U.S. Code 435 
This persistent judicial reluctance to directly enforce international law 
rules is normatively undesirable for two reasons. First, if U.S. courts con-
sistently decline to give effect to international law, litigants will often lack 
any forum in which to bring claims sounding in international law because 
individuals rarely have standing to appear before international tribunals.7 
Viewed from a litigant’s perspective, therefore, the recent judicial retreat 
from international law raises the possibility that that law will confer a right 
for which there exists no remedy.8 Second, if U.S. courts consistently de-
cline to give effect to international law, they will lose their ability to influ-
ence the development of that law. Viewed from the perspective of the Unit-
ed States, therefore, the recent judicial retreat from international law raises 
the possibility that that law will increasingly be shaped by foreign courts 
and tribunals whose long-term interests may not be consistent with those of 
the United States.9 
This Article aims to explain this judicial retreat from international law 
and to identify ways by which it may be reversed. To this end, it first seeks 
to understand precisely why U.S. courts are often reluctant to give effect to 
that law. It argues that this reluctance stems from two primary causes.10 
First, a not-insignificant number of U.S. judges have expressed some degree 
of ambivalence—occasionally rising to the level of hostility—towards the 
very concept of international law.11 The Article refers to this cause as “judi-
                                                                                                                           
 7 Outside of a few regional human rights courts and various ad hoc tribunals convened pursu-
ant to bilateral investment treaties, individuals typically have no standing to initiate a claim before 
international tribunals. The International Court of Justice and the Dispute Settlement Body of the 
World Trade Organization, for example, will only hear cases brought by sovereign states, and 
individuals cannot compel the various international criminal tribunals to initiate prosecutions 
against individuals accused of violating international law. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Judges and 
Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the Institut de Droit International’s Resolution on “the Activities 
of National Courts and the International Relations of Their State,” 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 423, 423–24 
(1994) (suggesting that national courts currently provide the best, and sometimes the only, chance 
for individuals to invoke international law). 
 8 As the Supreme Court observed almost a century ago: “Legal obligations that exist but can-
not be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp.” The W. Maid, 
257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922); see Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
40 (2014) (“A right without a remedy of any kind is not a right at all.”). 
 9 See Joshua Wallenstein, Note, Punishing Words: An Analysis of the Necessity of the Ele-
ment of Causation in Prosecutions for Incitement to Genocide, 54 STAN. L. REV. 351, 367–68 
(2001) (identifying the United States as a state that has historically exerted “great influence in 
international law”); see also Michael Kirby, International Law—the Impact on National Constitu-
tions, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 327, 362 (2006) (“[I]nternational law would be grievously injured 
if national courts, out of a sense of their own superiority or proclaimed ignorance, were to reject 
the rules and influence of the international legal order.”); Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in 
United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 30–34 (1995) (arguing that the current preference for 
domestic law exhibited by U.S. courts “corrodes the very system of international law”). 
 10 See infra notes 72–150 and accompanying text.  
 11 See infra 72–103 and accompanying text.  
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cial attitudes.” Second, a significant portion of the U.S. judiciary has had 
little exposure to or training in international law and international legal 
methods.12 The Article refers to this cause as “judicial inexperience.” The 
combined effect of these two causes, the Article suggests, is a judiciary that 
is extremely reluctant to rely directly on international law to provide a rule 
of decision in all but the least controversial cases. 
In the past, those who favor a more expansive role for international 
law in U.S. courts have sought to address these attitudinal and experiential 
obstacles via direct appeals to the U.S. judiciary.13 They have urged U.S. 
courts to scale back—or cast aside altogether—the various doctrinal rules 
that limit the ability of individuals to invoke international law directly in 
domestic litigation. 14  They have encouraged U.S. judges to familiarize 
themselves with international law norms in the hope that greater familiarity 
will lead to the more frequent application of these norms.15 And they have 
called for better education and training of U.S. judges with respect to inter-
national law.16 As yet, however, few of these arguments have had a signifi-
cant impact on judicial practice. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that 
the U.S. judiciary has actually become less receptive to claims sounding 
directly in international law in recent years.17 The ironic culmination of 
decades of legal scholarship urging U.S. judges to adopt a more monist ap-
proach to international law is a judiciary that is more profoundly dualist 
than at any previous point in the nation’s history.18 
This Article suggests a different approach. It argues that, instead of ad-
dressing U.S. judges directly, international law advocates should seek to 
persuade the political branches to enact domestic statutes that incorporate 
various rules of international law.19 Once this act has been done, history 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra 104–150 and accompanying text.  
 13 See infra notes 151–179 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra 155–166 and accompanying text.  
 15 See infra 167–177 and accompanying text.  
 16 See infra 175–179 and accompanying text.  
 17 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text; infra notes 48–71 and accompanying text.  
 18 Ingrid Wuerth, International Law, Domestic Law, and the United States, 108 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 116, 117 (2014) (book review) (observing that U.S. law has “unquestionably” shifted to a more 
dualist system over the past decade, though questioning whether this development is a positive 
one). There are two basic theories regarding the relationship between international and domestic 
law. The first theory, monism, posits that there is no distinction between the two. JAMES CRAW-
FORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 48–50 (8th ed. 2012). The mon-
ist view is simply that international law and domestic law are part of the same legal system and 
that domestic courts may draw upon international law as a rule of decision whenever necessary. 
Id. The second theory, dualism, posits that international law and domestic law exist in two sepa-
rate spheres and that the relationship between the two spheres is mediated by domestic actors. Id. 
 19 See infra notes 180–221 and accompanying text. This Article is not the first to argue that 
legislative action represents a particularly promising means by which international law may be 
given a more expansive role in the U.S. legal system. See, e.g., David H. Moore, An Emerging 
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suggests that judges will give effect to these statutory rules without com-
plaint.20 To the extent that international law advocates would like interna-
tional law to play a more prominent role in the U.S. legal system, therefore, 
this Article contends that they are more likely to achieve this goal by focus-
ing their attention on the executive and the legislative branches rather than 
the courts.21 
The Article advances this argument in full awareness that many mem-
bers of Congress have in recent years evidenced a not-insignificant degree 
                                                                                                                           
Uniformity for International Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 52–53 (2006) (“In addition to press-
ing claims appropriate for judicial incorporation, international law advocates need to turn to Con-
gress and treaty negotiators in the executive branch to translate treaties and custom into domestic 
law.”). Other scholars have urged the political branches to enact such statutes in order to give 
effect to particular treaties—or classes of treaties—to which the United States is a party. See, e.g., 
Hathaway et al., supra note 4, at 91–95 (urging Congress to pass “legislation declaring certain 
classes or categories of treaty obligations self-executing and enforceable through private rights of 
action”); Johanna Kalb, Dynamic Federalism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 1025, 1065 (2010) (discussing the need for federal legislation to give effect to international 
human rights treaties); David Sloss, Legislating Human Rights: The Case for Federal Legislation 
to Facilitate Domestic Judicial Application of International Human Rights Treaties, 35 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 445, 482 (2012) (stating that “the United States should enact federal legislation to facili-
tate domestic judicial application of international human rights treaties”); Penny M. Venetis, Mak-
ing Human Rights Treaty Law Actionable in the United States: The Case for Universal Implement-
ing Legislation, 63 ALA. L. REV. 97, 99 (2011) (arguing that “for human rights treaties to have 
maximum impact in the United States . . . it is critical to have universal implementing legislation 
that would apply to all treaties”); see also Edward W. Duffy, Note, The Avena Act: An Option to 
Induce State Implementation of Consular Notification Rights After Medellín, 98 GEO. L.J. 795, 
796 (2010) (proposing federal legislation “that would induce states to implement the [Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations] through conditional grants”); Nicole M. Howell, Comment, A 
Proposal for U.S. Implementation of the Vienna Convention’s Consular Notification Requirement, 
60 UCLA L. REV. 1324, 1354–60 (2013) (discussing the need for federal legislation to implement 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations). This Article is, however, the first to argue that 
incorporative statutes represent a structural solution to the various obstacles—doctrinal, attitudi-
nal, and experiential—that currently make it difficult for litigants to invoke international law in 
domestic litigation. Rather than focusing on how to give domestic effect to one particular treaty or 
treaty type, in other words, the Article focuses on the trans-substantive question of how all types 
of international law may achieve a more prominent role domestically. 
 20 See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 536–38 
(1995) (Hague Rules); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (United Nations Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 639 (1985) (United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) 
(law of foreign sovereign immunity); Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(law of war); Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2014) (Berne Con-
vention); Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 54–55 (2d Cir. 2014) (Tor-
ture Convention); United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (law of piracy); 
Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2011) (extradition treaties); Brzak v. Unit-
ed Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2010) (law of diplomatic immunity); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878, 883–84 (2d Cir. 1980) (human rights law). 
 21 See infra 222–291 and accompanying text.  
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of hostility towards international law.22 To be clear, the Article does not 
contend that the political branches are likely to enact legislation that incor-
porates various elements of international law into the U.S. legal system in 
the near future.23 It argues merely that the political branches are currently 
more likely than are the courts to take meaningful steps to bring internation-
al law home.24 Over the past two decades, Congress has enacted hundreds 
of statutes that incorporate a wide range of international law rules into the 
U.S. legal system.25 Over this same time period, U.S. courts have made it 
increasingly difficult for litigants to rely directly on international law as a 
source of rights.26 In light of this history, it would appear that the challenges 
of motivating the political branches to act are less intractable than the task 
of persuading the judiciary to take aggressive steps on its own initiative to 
enhance the domestic prominence of international law. This is not to mini-
mize the challenges inherent in persuading the political branches to act. 
Given the allocation of lawmaking power within the federal government, 
this task will never be easy. It is merely to point out that the political 
branches are today more likely than the judiciary to expand the role played 
by international law in the U.S. legal system. 
With this insight in mind, the Article considers whether certain types of 
incorporative statutes are more effective than others.27 After answering this 
question in the affirmative, it offers general advice to legislators and execu-
tive branch officials tasked with deciding how best to incorporate rules of 
international law into the U.S. Code.28 It also makes a number of specific 
suggestions as to how Congress should draft incorporative statutes going 
forward in order to maximize the likelihood that they will be given effect if 
and when they are litigated before U.S. courts.29 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 206–207 and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon). 
 23 See infra notes 151–179 and accompanying text. 
 24 Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 
HOUS. L. REV. 623, 668–69 (1998). 
 25 During this time period, Congress has enacted legislation to give effect to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, to the Convention on Cybercrime, and to a variety of intellectual property 
treaties. Cf. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International 
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1239 (2008) (“Each year, hundreds of con-
gressional-executive agreements on a wide range of international legal topics are enacted by sim-
ple majorities in the House and Senate and signed into law by the President, outside the traditional 
Treaty Clause process.”); Ashley Deeks, International Law in Congress: Contact, Resistance, and 
Embrace 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“Congress, it turns out, employs inter-
national law in a wide variety of ways, some of which predictably express Congress’s disdain for 
international law, but many of which embrace that law.”). 
 26 See infra notes 48–71 and accompanying text.  
 27 See infra notes 225–235 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 236–291 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 236–291 and accompanying text. 
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Part I of this Article surveys the contrasting scholarly views with re-
spect to the relationship between international law and the law of the United 
States and chronicles the judicial retreat from international law in recent 
years.30 Part II explores the reasons why U.S. judges are often reluctant to 
give effect to international law rules.31 Part III argues that direct appeals to 
the judiciary have failed to bring about any significant change in judicial 
behavior.32 Part IV contends that legislative action—via the enactment of 
incorporative statutes—represents the most promising means of reversing 
the recent judicial retreat from international law.33 Part V develops a typol-
ogy of incorporative statutes and argues that certain types of such statutes 
are likely to be more effective than others at expanding the role played by 
international law in the U.S. legal system.34 
I. THE DEBATE OVER THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN  
THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 
It has long been recognized that international law, under appropriate 
circumstances, may be incorporated into the domestic law of the United 
States.35 The principal actors who determine when and how such incorpora-
tion takes place are the three branches of the federal government.36 The 
president, acting with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, may ratify 
treaties that become the law of the land.37 A majority of Congress, acting 
with the consent of the president, may enact legislation that incorporates 
provisions of international law.38 And the federal courts may, under certain 
circumstances, use their common-law-making powers to recognize custom-
ary international law as a form of federal common law.39 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See infra notes 35–71 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 72–150 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 151–179 and accompanying text.  
 33 See infra notes 180–221 and accompanying text 
 34 See infra notes 222–291 and accompanying text.  
 35 See infra notes 180–199 and accompanying text. 
 36 This is not to suggest that state and local actors do not play any role in incorporating rules 
of international law into domestic law—they do. See Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does 
Exist: How the States Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 461 
(2004) (arguing that “in many circumstances, the states already control how and whether the 
United States will comply with certain obligations under international law”); Judith Resnik, Law’s 
Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 
115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1626 (2006) (“[T]ransnational precepts are often incorporated locally, 
through actions of a diverse group of state actors.”). The primary actors mediating between the 
domestic and the international, however, operate at the federal level. 
 37 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 38 See id. art. I, § 8, cls. 10, 18; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
 39 A number of scholars have argued that customary international law is, in fact, federal 
common law. See, e.g., Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. 
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The task of determining the legitimacy and the precise contours of 
each of these methods of incorporation has attracted a great deal of attention 
from legal scholars in recent years.40 It has also generated sharp debates 
among U.S. academics as to when international law incorporated via one of 
the above methods may provide a binding rule of decision in domestic liti-
gation. 41 This debate has given rise to two distinctly different scholarly 
viewpoints as to the role international law should play in the U.S. legal sys-
tem. This Article refers to these two differing perspectives as the interna-
tionalist and the nationalist viewpoints. 
A. The Internationalist/Nationalist Divide 
Some legal scholars—the internationalists—generally approach the 
question of whether U.S. courts should give effect to international law from 
the (external) perspective of the international legal system. Indeed, a num-
ber of internationalists have expressed the view that national courts should 
operate as de facto outposts of the international legal order.42 The interna-
tionalists tend to favor the expansive application of international law by 
U.S. courts.43 When the United States ratifies a treaty, the internationalists 
                                                                                                                           
REV. 2241, 2259 (2004) (arguing that international law is an “enclave of federal common law” 
that “authorizes the federal courts to hear cases and frame remedies . . . as they would any other 
common law cause of action”); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International 
Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 393 (1997) (noting that, for decades, 
federal courts have held that “customary international law is part of federal common law”). Others 
have voiced a contrary view. See Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and 
the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 915–19 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the 
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 817 (1997). 
 40 See infra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER, at xii (1964) (arguing that “it is sensible and necessary for states, regardless of their histo-
ry or orientation, to allow national courts increasingly to serve the cause of world order without 
regard to national affiliation”); PHILIP QUINCY WRIGHT, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW THROUGH MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 16–17 (1916) (“It is for states to supply 
the lack of a world administration for the execution of international law. As state courts of the 
United States enforce the federal constitution, laws and treaties, so it is the duty of independent 
governments to see that their courts enforce international law . . . .”); Hersch Lauterpacht, Deci-
sions of Municipal Courts as a Source of International Law, 10 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 65, 67, 93 
(1929) (describing national judges as “the organs and trustees of the international legal communi-
ty” and encouraging them to perform their duties with that “special care and devotion which flows 
from the consciousness that states, on whose behalf they administer international law, are the 
guardians of the international legal order which is as yet in a stage of minority”); see also First 
Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“Until international tribunals command a wider constituency, the courts of various countries 
afford the best means for the development of a respected body of international law.”). 
 43  See SHARON WEILL, THE ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS IN APPLYING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 158–61 (2014) (noting instances in which “activist” national courts applied 
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believe that U.S. judges should give effect to that treaty in domestic litiga-
tion to the extent that it is relevant. Where a rule of customary international 
law is on point, the internationalists argue that U.S. judges should enforce 
that rule. Although legislative action may occasionally serve to facilitate the 
domestic application of international law, the internationalists maintain that 
it is not strictly necessary.44 
Other scholars—the nationalists—generally approach this same ques-
tion from the (internal) perspective of a particular national legal system. In 
recent years, this approach has tended to favor a more limited application of 
international law by courts in the United States.45 When the United States 
ratifies a treaty, for example, the nationalists would discourage U.S. courts 
from giving direct effect to that treaty absent some clear signal from the 
political branches that they intended the treaty to be judicially enforceable. 
Similarly, where a rule of customary international law is on point, the na-
tionalists would discourage U.S. judges from giving effect to that rule un-
                                                                                                                           
international law expansively in order to realize “utopian” goals); Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Mis-
givings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National 
Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 159, 160 (1993) (“It is common among international lawyers to refer to 
national courts as a reliable if diffuse system for ensuring compliance with international norms, 
and therefore to urge judges to apply these norms rigorously.”). 
 44 See NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 1, at 82 (observing that it is “the ambition of international 
law to control the exercise of public power of the state and strengthen the position of the individu-
al” and arguing that this ambition is “best achieved in states that allow for . . . automatic incorpo-
ration”); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 
AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 323 (1992) (“Since, it is argued, direct applicability [of treaties and custom-
ary international law] will enhance the effectiveness of international norms, it will also generally 
enhance the respect for and general prestige of international law, to the benefit of world order.”); 
see also Louis Henkin, Lexical Priority or “Political Question”: A Response, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
524, 533 (1987) (expressing a preference for self-executing treaties to the exclusion of non-self-
executing treaties that would require implementing legislation). But see Karen Knop, Here and 
There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 501, 504 (2000) (dis-
cussing the act of translation inherent in any attempt by a domestic court to apply international 
law). 
 45 Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 805, 809 
(1989) (“Some suggest that courts inevitably reflect the biases of their culture and their nation’s 
foreign policy when cases touch on foreign affairs. Especially in such cases, the courts cannot be 
expected to render neutral decisions; their function, rather, should be to maintain and protect the 
United States, its policies and its constitutional structure against alien pressures.”). It should be 
emphasized that the nationalist view that international law should play a more limited role in do-
mestic litigation is a fairly modern development. See David Sloss, Schizophrenic Treaty Law, 43 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 15, 26 (2007) (observing that “the nationalist presumption that treaties do not 
create individually enforceable rights is a fairly new doctrinal innovation”); see also Michael P. 
Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1901–1945, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 191, 194 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011) (“In 
contrast with the era to follow [post-1945], separation of powers concerns about trenching on the 
prerogatives of the political branches did not feature prominently in the Supreme Court’s treaty 
jurisprudence of the time [1901–1945], even in public law disputes with the federal government.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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less the political branches have specifically authorized its use in some 
way.46 Although the nationalists are not opposed to giving international law 
a more expansive role in the U.S. legal system per se, they would prefer that 
the political branches (rather than the judiciary) take the lead on this issue. 
The nationalists acknowledge that these various limitations may mean that 
certain international law rules go unenforced. They contend, however, that 
this outcome is compelled by questions of institutional competence and the 
constitutional structure of the United States. 
In practice, of course, there is some overlap in the views of the interna-
tionalists and the nationalists. Even the most fervent internationalist is like-
ly to concede, for example, that there are some situations in which a nation-
al court may decline to enforce a particular rule of international law. And 
even the most dedicated nationalist will also concede that it is generally 
desirable that national courts interpret and apply international law in such a 
way so as to avoid putting a state in breach of its international obligations. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to conceptualize these two viewpoints as existing 
at opposite ends of a spectrum.47 At the nationalist end, there is a distinct 
reluctance to allow U.S. courts to give effect to international law in domes-
tic litigation absent clear evidence—such as a domestic statute authorizing 
its use—that the political branches intended this result. At the international-
ist end, there is a strong presumption that international law can and should 
be directly applied by U.S. courts whenever it is invoked by a litigant. 
B. The Judicial Retreat from International Law 
In recent years, U.S. courts have adopted the nationalist viewpoint in a 
series of high-profile cases.48 In 2008, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                           
 46 U.S. courts may also decline to apply international law on the grounds that doing so would 
flood the courts with litigation or that its application would be contrary to principles of federalism. 
See Michael A. McKenzie, Treaty Enforcement in U.S. Courts, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 596, 609 
(1993) (stating that “[t]he private enforcement of major international agreements like Geneva III 
might flood courts”); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International 
Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 370, 462 (2002) (suggesting that treating customary international law 
as federal common law “offends constitutional norms of federalism”). 
 47 Sharon Weill has developed a useful typology of national courts roles with respect to the 
application of international humanitarian law that loosely tracks the nationalist/internationalist 
divide. See WEILL, supra note 43, at 196. At the nationalist extreme, Weill argues that national 
courts distort international law in order to legitimate state actions that are clearly impermissible. 
Id. At the internationalist extreme, she argues that national courts apply international law even 
where it contradicts their own national law in order to provide greater legal protections to individ-
uals. Id. 
 48 See David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-
Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135, 137 (2012) (“In Medellín, the Supreme Court threw 
its substantial weight behind the nationalist camp.”); Peter J. Spiro, Sovereigntism’s Twilight, 31 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 307, 307 (2013) (“On key issues, sovereigntism is also carrying the day in 
the federal courts, with further major victories likely just over the horizon.”). See, e.g., CURTIS A. 
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in Medellín v. Texas was called upon to determine whether a decision ren-
dered by the International Court of Justice was “self-executing,” that is, 
whether it constituted a binding source of judicially-enforceable federal law 
without further action by Congress. 49  In answering this question in the 
negative, the Court articulated a test for determining whether a treaty was 
self-executing that was arguably stricter than the existing standard.50 At the 
same time, the Court stated that “the background presumption is that inter-
national agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, general-
ly do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in 
domestic courts.”51 Commentators have argued that this decision “effective-
ly flip[s] the presumption in favor of self-execution and a private right of 
action that prevailed for a century and a half to a presumption against.”52 
The upshot, in the view of these same commentators, is that “[t]he courts of 
the United States are today less willing than at any previous time in history 
to directly enforce the Article II treaty obligations of the United States 
through a private right of action.”53 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also taken steps to roll back the (already 
quite limited) role played by customary international law in domestic litiga-
                                                                                                                           
BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 330 (2013) (“[A]lthough they some-
times apply international law directly, courts tend not to do so if they perceive that such applica-
tion is contrary to the wishes of the political branches.”). 
 49 552 U.S. at 505; see Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (stating that a treaty 
is “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it oper-
ates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision” but that “when either of the parties en-
gages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial de-
partment; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court”), 
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); see also 
Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming 
Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 299 (2005) (explaining the distinction between “self-
executing” and “non-self-executing” treaties). In some cases, the political branches have declared 
certain treaties non-self-executing. In other cases, the courts have done so. In either case, the ef-
fect is the same—to make it difficult (if not impossible) for individuals to directly invoke the 
rights guaranteed in a particular treaty in domestic litigation. 
 50 See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505 n.2; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Separation of Powers as a 
Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1618–19 (2008) (noting that the major-
ity in Medellín “appears to presume that a treaty is not self-executing unless there is affirmative 
evidence that the parties intended that the treaty have domestic legal force” and concluding that 
“[i]f this is the test, then very few, if any, treaties will pass it”). 
 51 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3 (citations and internal punctuation omitted). 
 52 Hathaway et al., supra note 4, at 57; see John T. Parry, A Primer on Treaties and § 1983 
After Medellín v. Texas, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 35, 37 (2009) (“[A]lthough Medellín first 
and foremost hampers the domestic enforcement of public international law, it is also part of an 
ongoing jurisprudence that seeks to control and limit the ability of individuals to enforce federal 
rights in a variety of circumstances.”). 
 53 Hathaway et al., supra note 4, at 90. 
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tion.54 In 2004, the Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain imposed limits on the 
number and type of customary international law norms that give rise to a 
cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).55 Although this deci-
sion did not qualify as a complete victory for the nationalists—the Court 
declined to end the practice of litigation under the ATS altogether, which 
some nationalists had urged it to do—its effect was to make it more difficult 
to enforce certain rules of customary international law in domestic litiga-
tion. Nine years later, the Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
further restricted the ability of plaintiffs to enforce these rules via the ATS 
when it held that that statute did not apply extraterritorially.56 This decision 
effectively barred foreign plaintiffs from bringing claims against foreign 
defendants for violations of international law that occurred on foreign soil.57 
This same pattern of judicial retreat from international law is also dis-
cernible in several recent decisions rendered by the federal courts of appeal. 
Virtually all of these courts have held, for example, that the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations does not create judicially-enforceable private 
rights. 58  These same courts also frequently demand in treaty cases “a 
threshold showing of ‘judicial enforceability’ beyond what is required for 
statutory and constitutional provisions.”59 In 2010, for example, the Second 
Circuit concluded in Katel LLC v. AT&T Corp. that an international tele-
communications treaty did not give rise to a private right of action in part 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Although the Court has long recognized that customary international law is a part of the 
law of the United States, it has also held that such law may provide a rule of decision only where 
there is “no controlling executive or legislative act . . . .” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 
(1900). Congress has chosen to incorporate customary international law into U.S. statutes on a 
number of occasions. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2012) (law of war); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012) 
(law of nations); Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (law of nations). U.S. courts have 
also recognized that certain customary international law rules are a part of the common law. See, 
e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010) (holding that the FSIA does not govern claims 
relating to foreign official immunity and that the courts should look to the common law to resolve 
questions under this doctrine). 
 55 542 U.S. at 732 (stating that “federal courts should not recognize private claims . . . for 
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized 
nations than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted”). 
 56 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).  
 57 Id. at 1676 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 58 Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2008); see Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 
183, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 
2000) (en banc) (describing, though not explicitly endorsing, the government’s contention that 
Article 36 creates no judicially enforceable individual rights); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60, 
62 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc) (declining to hold that Article 36 does not confer individual rights, 
though stating that “the Vienna Convention’s preamble explicitly disclaims any attempt to create 
individual rights”). But see Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 834 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that “Article 
36 confers individual rights on detained nationals”). 
 59 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Ju-
dicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 604–05 (2008) (citations omitted).  
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because that treaty did not specifically address the question of whether it 
was intended to create private rights. 60  This approach to determining 
whether treaties create private rights in U.S. courts has been fairly criticized 
as “hyper-exacting” in that it “incorrectly focuses on the absence of specific 
enforcement language as clear evidence that the signatory states did not in-
tend to create [private] rights.”61 In any event, the end result is that it is in-
creasingly difficult for litigants to invoke treaties as a source of rights be-
fore the federal courts of appeal. 
These same courts have also expressed reservations about giving effect 
to various rules of customary international law.62 In 2011, for example, the 
Ninth Circuit held in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC that a plaintiff seeking to bring 
a cause of action under the ATS must first exhaust local remedies, a re-
quirement that seems calculated to reduce the likelihood that a U.S. court 
will ultimately be required to give effect to international law in cases 
brought under the ATS.63 In a number of other cases, the lower federal 
courts have been asked to apply customary international law outside the 
context of a statutory enactment.64 In the overwhelming majority of cases, 
these courts have refused to do so, holding that the customary international 
law rule in question had been displaced by a (wholly domestic) act of the 
executive or legislative branch.65 
Finally, there also appears to be an increasing willingness on the part 
of U.S. courts to make aggressive use of other doctrinal rules—including 
standing,66 personal jurisdiction,67 and the doctrine of forum non conven-
                                                                                                                           
 60 607 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2010) (“No wording in the [treaties] creates a private right of ac-
tion . . . .”). 
 61 Gandara, 528 F.3d at 834 (Rodgers, J., concurring). 
 62 M. Shah Alam, Enforcement of International Human Rights by Domestic Courts in the 
United States, 10 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 27, 42 (2004) (arguing that “U.S. courts are gen-
erally hesitant and reluctant to apply the customary law of human rights directly”). 
 63 671 F.3d 736, 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995 
(2013). 
 64 See, e.g., Oliva v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 65 See id.; TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 302–03 (D.C. Cir. 
2005); Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Gisbert v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1447–48 (5th Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453–
55 (11th Cir. 1986). The U.S. Supreme Court will look to customary international law when deal-
ing with certain issues (such as border disputes) that arise between U.S. States. See Hinderlider v. 
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106–07, 110 (1938); see also Edwin 
Dewitt Dickinson, The Law of Nations as a Part of the National Law of the United States, II, 101 
U. PA. L. REV. 792, 821 (1953) (“[T]he Supreme Court from the beginning has resolved interstate 
boundary disputes in recourse to the Law of Nations.”). 
 66 See United States v. Bout, 731 F.3d 233, 240 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A]bsent protest or objec-
tion by the offended sovereign, [a defendant] has no standing to raise the violation of international 
law as an issue.” (citations omitted)); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 658 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134–
35 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that the “general rule is that non-resident aliens have no standing to sue 
in United States courts” (citations omitted)), aff’d in part, rev'd in part, 654 F.3d 11, 65 (D.C. Cir. 
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iens68—to decline to hear cases with some connection to a foreign jurisdic-
tion.69 It is precisely these cases, of course, that are most likely to raise in-
teresting and novel issues of international law. In addition, U.S. courts have 
long invoked the “last-in-time rule” as a justification for declining to give 
effect to treaties to which the United States is a party.70 Although this rule is 
ostensibly neutral in that it directs courts to give effect to the more recent 
statute or treaty in the event of a conflict between them, in practice the rule 
more frequently results in statutes displacing treaties than the other way 
around.71 Again, the result is to limit the role played by international law in 
the U.S. legal system. 
*        *        * 
This judicial retreat from international law is normatively undesirable 
for two reasons. First, in many cases there will be no other forum with ju-
risdiction to hear particular disputes sounding in international law. Viewed 
from a litigant’s perspective, therefore, this trend presents the very real pos-
                                                                                                                           
2011), vacated sub nom. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 527 F. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnation-
al Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1088–89 (2010) (discussing in-
creased use of standing doctrine to limit transnational litigation). 
 67 Pamela Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript 
at 10–11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2546351##, archived at 
https://perma.cc/U84X-H4WP?type=pdf (describing recent judicial “retreat” from transnational liti-
gation via revisions to personal jurisdiction rules). 
 68 See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 
2009) (dismissing suit alleging torture in violation of international law on forum non conveniens 
grounds). 
 69 See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of 
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 724 (2012) (“Federal courts have begun to constrain 
the ability of plaintiffs to file [Alien Tort Statute] cases. . . . [C]ourts have done this not only by 
interpreting international law narrowly, but also by employing domestic procedural devices that 
limit the application of international law in domestic courts.”); see also Bookman, supra note 67, 
at 8–19 (discussing the growth of judicial avoidance tactics by U.S. courts); Stephen B. Burbank, 
International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming a Paper Tiger?, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 663, 
672–73 (2012) (describing several “recent developments . . . that make [international civil] litiga-
tion harder to maintain in United States courts”); Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating 
the Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the 
Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 259, 259–60 (2012) (discussing U.S. courts’ recent 
unwillingness “to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over multinational[]” corporations in human 
rights cases). 
 70 The U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted the Supremacy Clause to accord equal status 
to statutes and treaties. When a conflict arises between a statute and a treaty, the “last-in-time” 
rule holds that the more recent enactment shall prevail. See Breard v, Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 
(1998); see also Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties 
and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 342–44 (2005). 
 71 See Andrea Bianchi, International Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, 
15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 751, 761–62 (2004); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 160; Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 595–96 (2007). 
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sibility that that law will confer a right for which there exists no remedy. 
Second, U.S. courts that consistently find ways to avoid applying interna-
tional law will eventually lose the ability to shape that law, an outcome that 
is arguably contrary to the long-term best interests of the United States. In 
light of these costs, the question that naturally arises is precisely why U.S. 
courts are today so reluctant to give effect to international law.  
II. EXPLAINING THE JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO GIVE EFFECT TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The contemporary judicial reluctance to give direct effect to interna-
tional law is attributable to two primary causes. The first is judicial atti-
tudes. Many U.S. judges are, for lack of a better word, unenthusiastic about 
relying upon international law to provide a rule of decision. The second is 
judicial inexperience. Many U.S. judges are unfamiliar with international 
methods and sources and are, consequently, wary of relying on these same 
methods and sources in deciding cases that come before them. 
A. Judicial Attitudes 
U.S. judges have long had an ambivalent relationship with internation-
al law.72 Although the precise reasons for this ambivalence are complex, it 
is likely attributable in part to the unique legal culture that exists within the 
United States. Almost twenty years ago, Rosalyn Higgins noted the im-
portant role that legal culture could play in shaping the ways that national 
judges interact with international law: 
In some jurisdictions international law will be treated as a famil-
iar topic, one that both the judge and the counsel before him will 
expect to deal with on a routine basis . . . . But there is another 
culture that exists, in which it is possible to become a practising 
lawyer without having studied international law, and indeed to 
become a judge knowing no international law. Psychologically 
that disposes both counsel and judge to treat international law as 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 
2277, 2291 (1991). Professor Brilmayer notes:  
The familiar “passive virtues” rhetoric reveals a general philosophy of judicial mod-
esty that goes beyond specific doctrinal limitations to what sometimes seems almost 
an allergic reaction to anything international. As Judge Aubrey Robinson was re-
ported to have put it: “I’m nothing but a trial judge in one federal court. I don’t run 
the universe, and I have nothing to do with international affairs.”  
Id. (quoting Tracy Thompson, Hijacker Gets Thirty-Year Prison Term, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1989, 
at A39).  
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some exotic branch of the law, to be avoided if at all possible, and 
to be looked upon as if it is unreal, of no practical application in 
the real world.73 
In recent years, a number of commentators have argued that U.S. judges do, 
in fact, tend to view international law as something that is both exotic and 
unwelcome. One scholar has observed, for example, that “United States 
courts have historically shown an ambivalent commitment to the applica-
tion of international law.”74 Another has argued that this ambivalence in 
many cases crosses the line into outright “hostility.”75 Still other scholars 
have argued that U.S. judges are “wary” of international law76 or that this 
law makes U.S. courts “uncomfortable”77 or that U.S. courts exhibit a “con-
tinuing, seemingly visceral resistance to treating modern international law 
in both treaty and customary form as law of the United States.”78 
The existence of these attitudes is not altogether surprising. National 
courts are institutions created and maintained by a particular state. In cases 
when they are called upon to apply international law, it is possible (indeed, 
it is likely) that national judges will feel a greater affiliation with the nation-
al legal culture in which they are trained and resist attempts to apply inter-
                                                                                                                           
 73 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 
206 (1996); see Bianchi, supra note 71, at 781 (“Regardless of the formal instruments of incorpo-
ration . . . the extent to which international law is actually used by the courts within the formal 
constraints of constitutional arrangements largely depends on the legal culture prevailing at any 
particular time.”). 
 74 Martin A. Rogoff, Application of Treaties and the Decisions of International Tribunals in 
the United States and France: Reflections on Recent Practice, 58 ME. L. REV. 405, 428 (2006); 
see also Paul R. Dubinsky, United States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYS-
TEMS 631, 631 (Diana Shelton ed., 2011) (“Ambivalence about international law . . . can be found 
in . . . federal and state courts . . . .”). 
 75 Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 195, 200 (2004) (claiming that “[u]nlike most other developed countries, the United States 
has assumed a skeptical, sometimes openly hostile posture to international law”); see Catherine 
Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law 
in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 259 (2001) (“The reluctance and open hostility some 
federal courts express toward international law claims reflect ambivalence toward the legitimacy 
of international law as a source of law.”). 
 76 Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 322 (2004) (observing that Justices on the U.S. Su-
preme Court “are very wary . . . of adopting any rule that may make them or the United States 
beholden to laws beyond their control”). 
 77 John K. Setear, A Forest with No Trees: The Supreme Court and International Law in the 
2003 Term, 91 VA. L. REV. 579, 664 (2005); see Jonathan I. Charney, International Law Deci-
sions in National Courts, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 394, 395 (1997) (book review) (remarking on the “the 
negative attitude of U.S. lawyers, especially the judiciary, toward the relevance and usefulness of 
international law” and suggesting that these attitudes “may be explained in part by the failure of 
U.S. law schools, unlike those of some other states, to train all students in the international legal 
system”). 
 78 Steinhardt, supra note 5, at 845. 
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national or foreign law whose origins lie outside of that culture. As Brain-
erd Currie once observed: 
Lawyers and judges are ordinarily schooled in their own domestic 
law. Day in and day out they think, advise, and argue and dispose 
of cases in terms of that law. . . . The intrusion of foreign law is 
an unsettling departure from routine, involving even under ideal 
conditions some encounter with the unfamiliar, some departure 
from usual procedures, some additional burden; and there are sit-
uations in which the degree of unfamiliarity and the burden of 
understanding can become oppressive.79 
Even though national judges may be uniquely well-positioned to enforce a 
disparate and decentralized body of international law, they are still national 
courts at their core.80 As such, they will often reflect the values of their na-
tional legal culture. 
Whatever the precise label that one applies to these U.S. judicial atti-
tudes towards international law—ambivalence, hostility, discomfort, wari-
ness, or visceral dislike—scholars agree that these attitudes can and do lead 
U.S. judges to refuse to give effect to that law.81 Theories abound as to 
these attitudes’ precise origins. Some scholars have speculated these atti-
tudes are attributable to the unique reverence that the U.S. Constitution oc-
cupies in the U.S. legal system.82 Others have suggested that they stem from 
                                                                                                                           
 79 BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 9 (1963); see In re 
Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 306 (3d Cir. 2004) (Roth, J., concurring) 
(“Many times, rather than wade through the mire of a complex set of foreign statutes and case law, 
judges marginalize the [Hague Evidence] Convention as an unnecessary ‘option.’”). 
 80 See Benvenisti, supra note 43, at 161 (“Judges firmly refuse to live up to the vision of in-
ternational lawyers.”); see also Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs 
Legalism, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 546 (2011) (“Judges have no particular incentive to defy their 
own national governments for the sake of ambiguous international ideals. And, if they did, it is not 
clear how they could constrain their governments, most of which demand, and receive, freedom of 
action in foreign affairs.”); Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of National 
Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57, 75–76 (2011). 
 81 Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 52 
(2004) (discussing Justices Scalia and Thomas as espousing a “nationalist” jurisprudence that “is 
characterized by . . . resistance to comity or international law as meaningful constraints on nation-
al prerogatives”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1117–18 
(2000) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court is “regarded by many foreign judges and lawyers as 
resolutely parochial in its refusal to look either to international or foreign law”). 
 82 See, e.g., Bianchi, supra note 71, at 754 (suggesting that the U.S. legal system is hostile to 
international law because of a “perception that the fundamental tenets of the domestic legal order, 
as enshrined in the Constitution, cannot be altered by a body of law which does not exclusively 
emanate from the national societal body”); Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sov-
ereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–4 (2000) (claim-
ing that reverence for the Constitution makes it “almost unimaginable that we would yield politi-
cal or legal authority to institutions and actors outside of this web popular sovereignty”); Michael 
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a lack of familiarity with foreign cultures.83 Others have argued that they 
can be traced to concerns that international human rights law might sup-
plant the rights accorded by the U.S. Constitution and national civil rights 
law.84 Others have argued that these attitudes “stem from concerns about 
institutional competence and deference to the political branches.” 85 Still 
others contend that this reluctance to apply international law stems in part 
from “an ideological commitment to a democratic process, wherein Con-
gress takes the lead in determining the content of the rights to enforced by 
the judiciary.”86 
Whatever the precise explanation for these attitudes, it is interesting 
that the intensity of judicial skepticism towards international law appears to 
fluctuate depending on the type of international law at issue.87 Although the 
term “international law” formally encompasses any and all treaties negoti-
ated between and among sovereign states, the range of topics covered by 
these treaties is vast. As a form of shorthand, legal scholars often distin-
guish “public law” treaties from “private law” treaties.88 Public law treaties 
are those international agreements whose primary purpose is to regulate or 
otherwise constrain the behavior of states and state actors.89 Private law 
treaties, by contrast, are those international agreements whose primary pur-
pose is to allocate rights and responsibilities between and among private 
individuals.90 The distinction is significant because U.S. courts are often 
                                                                                                                           
Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 
1765 (2009). But see Daniel Bodansky & Jutta Brunnee, The Role of National Courts in the Field 
of International Environmental Law, 7 REV. EUR. COMP. INT’L ENVTL. L. 11, 14 (1998) (“[T]he 
extent to which international environmental law enters the domestic sphere seems more dependent 
upon judicial attitudes towards international law than upon the formal features of the constitution-
al system . . . .”). 
 83 See Lori A. Fields, Note, Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dis-
trict Court: The Supreme Court Undermines the Hague Evidence Convention and Confounds the 
International Discovery Process, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 217, 308–09 (1988). 
 84 Hathaway et al., supra note 4, at 68–70. But see Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law 
for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1817 
(2009) (noting parallels between international law and constitutional law in that both are forms of 
public law that “suffer from deep uncertainty about what counts as authoritative legal norms”). 
 85 Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United States 
Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 28 (1992). 
 86 Sloss, supra note 19, at 482. 
 87 See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Why Is Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?, in THE 
COST OF ACTING ALONE: MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 345 (Shepard Forman 
& Patrick Stewart eds., 2001) (seeking to explain why the United States is generally reluctant to 
ratify human rights treaties). 
 88 See John F. Coyle, Rethinking the Commercial Law Treaty, 45 GA. L. REV. 343, 347 & 
n.11 (2011). 
 89 See id. Treaties relating to human rights, immigration, humanitarian law, consular relations, 
and the law of armed conflict are well-known examples of public law treaties. 
 90 See id. Treaties relating to intellectual property, the international sale of goods, and arbitra-
tion are well-known examples of private law treaties. 
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reluctant to enforce public law treaties against U.S. executive branch agen-
cies and officials.91 These same courts are, however, generally willing to 
give effect to private law treaties in resolving disputes between private indi-
viduals.92 
Consider, by way of an example, judicial practice with respect to pub-
lic law treaties that limit or otherwise constrain the discretion of federal ex-
ecutive branch actors.93 A number of commentators have argued that U.S. 
courts frequently interpret these treaties “so as to allow maximum freedom 
for the actions of domestic officials.”94 One scholar, for example, has ar-
gued that the restrictive treaty interpretations adopted by judges in a number 
of cases “do not call into question U.S. courts’ competency to apply interna-
tional treaty law so much as . . . cast doubt on courts’ commitment to inter-
national treaty law.”95 Other scholars contend that the “judiciary generally 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See generally David Sloss, United States, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY 
ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 504, 505 (David Sloss, ed.) (2009) (“[I]n litigation be-
tween private parties, courts are more likely to apply a transnationalist approach than a nationalist 
approach. However, in cases where private parties are adverse to government actors, courts are 
more likely to apply a nationalist approach than a transnationalist approach.”). 
 92 Id.; see Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1450, 1474 (2006) (book review) (noting that “modern courts seem increasingly reluctant to 
adjudicate rights under public law treaties,” but that “private law treaties . . . are a different mat-
ter”). 
 93 This ambivalence about giving effect to public law treaties typically manifests itself exclu-
sively in cases in which the treaty purports to constrain the discretion of federal officials. U.S. 
courts have long enforced public law treaties against state officials. See, e.g., Asakura v. City of 
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924). 
 94 Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretations of International Agreements by Domestic Courts and the 
Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 559, 566 (1996); see David J. Bederman, 
Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1469–
70 (1999) (arguing that courts in treaty interpretation cases “profess independence and maintain 
judicial review of treaty claims, but actually extend unnecessary and untoward deference to execu-
tive branch positions that tend to frustrate the litigation of those claims”); Thomas Franck, The 
Courts, the State Department, and National Policy: A Criterion for Judicial Abdication, 44 MINN. 
L. REV. 1101, 1123 (1960) (suggesting on the one hand that “it is right that the legal notions of the 
political branches of government should be respected by the courts” but claiming on the other 
hand that “there is no reason for the courts to abdicate their function in deference to this principle 
in those cases in which there is at stake no matter of international law substantially affecting the 
national interest”); see also Rogoff, supra, at 613 (“In Sale, Alvarez-Machain, Schlunk, Áerospa-
tiale, and Sumitomo . . . [t]he Court in effect preserved the freedom of action of domestic decision-
makers, rather than limiting their freedom of action in the interests of the other party or parties to 
the international agreement.”). 
 95 Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 
44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 463 (2004); see Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic 
Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 242 (2008) 
(“[T]hrough an assortment of avoidance doctrines . . . the identification or misidentification of 
customary international law, and expansive or restrictive interpretation of treaties, national courts 
managed to align their findings and judgments with the preferences of their governments and thus 
to guarantee them complete latitude in external affairs.”). 
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follows the executive’s lead instead of pushing the executive toward greater 
international engagement.”96 And one exhaustive survey of reported cases 
found that U.S. courts are far more likely to adopt a restrictive interpretation 
of a treaty in cases in which the U.S. government (or an executive official) 
was the named defendant than in cases brought against purely private ac-
tors.97 When litigants seek to rely on international treaties to constrain the 
discretion of the executive branch, in short, the courts are generally reluc-
tant to give effect to those treaties. 
This reluctance is greatly reduced—though not eliminated altogether—
in cases where the treaty in question is a private law treaty. It is almost un-
heard of, for instance, for a U.S. court to refuse to give effect to perhaps the 
quintessential private law treaty—the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”).98 There are, to be sure, 
some exceptions to this general rule.99 Some courts have declined to give 
effect to treaty provisions granting foreign companies special rights with 
respect to the hiring and firing of their own nationals.100 Others have sought 
to narrow the scope of the Hague Evidence Convention.101 Still others have 
refused to give effect to certain provisions in treaties relating to the protec-
                                                                                                                           
 96 Abebe & Posner, supra note 80, at 529. 
 97 See Sloss, supra note 91, at 534 (“[C]ourts are more likely to apply nationalist tools [of 
interpretation] in government litigation than in private litigation.”); see also id. at 545 (“Remarka-
bly, the government won all thirty-one cases in which a private party was adverse to a government 
actor, one or both parties invoked a treaty, and the court applied a nationalist approach.”). 
 98 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 
1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. Occasionally, a U.S. judge will express 
some degree of disaffection with this treaty. See, e.g., Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 
F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[T]he Uniform Commercial Code, as previously noted 
does not apply to this case, because the State Department undertook to fix something that was not 
broken by helping to create the Sale of Goods Convention which varies from the Uniform Com-
mercial Code in many significant ways.” (emphasis added)). As a general rule, however, U.S. 
courts give effect to the CISG without complaint. See, e.g., Allied Dynamics Corp. v. Kennametal, 
Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 276, 298–99 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel El-
ecs., GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752–53 (D. Md. 2011). 
 99 See Mathias Reimann, Parochialism in American Conflicts Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 
379 (2001) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has construed certain private law treaties “over-
whelmingly from an American perspective” and that the Court has made “no visible attempt to 
maintain decisional harmony with other contracting nations”). 
 100 See Gerald D. Silver, Note, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties and United 
States Discrimination Law: The Right of Branches of Foreign Companies to Hire Executives “of 
Their Choice,” 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 765, 775–76 (1989) (arguing that the employer choice pro-
vision in some FCN treaties does, in fact, confer rights on foreign companies that are denied to 
domestic companies); John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the 
Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 302, 343–44 (2013). 
 101 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Incredible Shrinking Hague Evidence Convention, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 73, 73 (2003) (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court for adopting “hypertechnical” read-
ings of the Hague Evidence Convention and other private law treaties that operate in practice to 
“minimize their scope”). 
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tion of intellectual property. 102  These exceptions notwithstanding, U.S. 
courts are today much more likely to enforce private law treaties (as against 
private parties) than to enforce public law treaties (as against public offi-
cials). This pattern of practice suggests that current judicial ambivalence 
with respect to international law is rooted less in a commitment to a demo-
cratic process—properly ratified private law treaties, after all, are every bit 
as democratically legitimate as properly ratified public law treaties—than in 
a belief that individuals ought to rely on the rights afforded by wholly do-
mestic law when seeking to constrain the actions of the executive branch.103 
B. Judicial Inexperience 
Most U.S. judges have had little—if any—training in international 
law.104 As a consequence, they are often unfamiliar with the content of that 
law, the sources of that law, and the unique methods that international law-
yers use to determine the precise meaning of that law.105 Curtis Bradley and 
Jack Goldsmith, for example, have argued that “[i]nternational law is a 
mystery to most U.S. judges” and that “most judges are not familiar with 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See infra notes 244–251 and accompanying text (discussing the Paris Convention). 
 103 See Bederman, supra note 94, at 1487–88 (“[T]he farther removed treaties appear to judg-
es as part of the national legal order, the more likely courts will defer or abstain in their applica-
tion and interpretation.”). 
 104 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Alien Tort Claims, Sovereign Immunity and International Law 
in U.S. Courts, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 323, 326–27 (1988) (“Federal judges in the United States typi-
cally are not experts in international law. Nor are their law clerks. When they deal with interna-
tional law questions, they are dealing with an unfamiliar system shaped by unfamiliar sources and 
mechanisms.”); Janet Koven Levit, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: The Glass Is Half Full, 11 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 29, 33 (2007) (“One real consequence of the academy’s failure to recognize 
state courts as transnational actors is that state courts, state judges, and state bars remain ill-
equipped to grapple with questions of international law, especially questions as complicated as 
those posed by the Vienna Convention.”); Douglas J. Sylvester, Comment, Customary Interna-
tional Law, Forcible Abductions, and America’s Return to the “Savage State,” 42 BUFF. L. REV. 
555, 620 (1994) (“Arguably, the greatest barrier to applying international law is the ignorance of 
the United States judiciary about the sources and effect of that law.”). But see Charney, supra note 
45, at 809 (expressing confidence in ability of U.S. judges to resolve international law questions); 
Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and International Human Rights, 30 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 359, 383–84 (2006) (“[T]he question of judicial competence in 
the transnational law arena is increasingly a relic of an earlier time. In law schools today, interna-
tional law, including human rights law, is one of the fastest growing areas of the curriculum.”); 
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2389 (1991) 
(“When difficult questions of international law do arise, American courts have traditionally been 
deemed competent to decide them.”). 
 105 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 875 (“[I]nternational law issues have arisen much 
less frequently in U.S. courts during this century than have ‘domestic’ issues such as interpreta-
tion of the U.S. Constitution and federal and state statutes.”); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Beyond 
Wealth: Stories of Art, War, and Greed, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1075, 1103–04 (2008) (“Turning to 
international law requires knowledge of the law and recognition of its applicability. Both qualities 
seem to have declined in the United States in recent decades.”). 
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the materials relevant to the resolution of international law questions . . . 
.”106 Another well-known scholar has commented that “most American law 
graduates are in a state of abysmal ignorance when it comes to international 
law” and that “[o]ur judges, for the most part, know it only as an exotic ex-
port of political science departments and their clerks have neither the inter-
est nor ability to look it up.”107 Still another scholar once stated that “most 
judges in the United States . . . have, at the most, a superficial familiarity 
with the theory of law creation in the international legal system and only the 
vaguest notion of how the system functions.”108 Other commentators have 
pointed out that most federal judges are “unlikely to have great facility with 
international legal, political, or economic theories or materials” and are 
“more likely to be chosen because of their prominence as litigators or as 
public officials.”109 
It is tempting to dismiss these views as academic brickbats hurled from 
the ivory tower. The suggestion that many U.S. judges are not well-versed 
in international law has, however, been echoed by a number of prominent 
U.S. jurists. Justice Blackmun once observed in a speech to the American 
Society of International Law that U.S. judges “are relatively unfamiliar with 
interpreting instruments of international law.” 110  Justice O’Connor once 
observed that U.S. judges have “no special competence” to “resolve dis-
putes that involve questions of foreign and international law.” 111  These 
frank statements—along with a number of similar observations made by 
lower federal court judges—suggest that a significant proportion of the U.S. 
judiciary is, in fact, largely unfamiliar with international law and the 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 874–75; see Friedrich Kratochwil, The Role of 
Domestic Courts as Agencies of the International Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 236, 252 (Falk et al., eds., 1985) (observing that “courts are often quite 
oblivious to their proper duties and role within the international legal order”). 
 107 Thomas M. Franck, Dr. Pangloss Meets the Grinch: A Pessimistic Comment on Harold 
Koh’s Optimism, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 694–95 (1998). 
 108 Harold G. Maier, The Role of Experts in Proving International Human Rights Law in Do-
mestic Courts: A Commentary, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 205, 205 (1996); see McFadden, supra 
note 9, at 37 (“Few judges and lawyers approach their work with a solid grounding in the sub-
stance and methods of international law . . . . Both lawyers and judges lack experience in handling 
international issues and are ill-disposed to explore unfamiliar territory.”). 
 109 Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to 
the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 187 (further explaining that “[i]t is difficult to 
recall more than a handful of judges who had significant foreign affairs experience before their 
appointment to the federal bench”). 
 110 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a Decent 
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, Address Before The American Society of International Law 
(Apr. 8, 1994), in 88 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 383, 388 (1994). 
 111 Sandra Day O’Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U J. INT’L L. & POL. 35, 41 
(1997); see Slaughter, supra note 81, at 1109 (“At the 41st Congress of the Union Internationale 
des Advocates[,] . . . Justice O’Connor lamented the fact that lawyers and judges in America and 
elsewhere tend to forget that other legal systems exist.”). 
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sources that comprise it.112 This is not to suggest, of course, that all U.S. 
judges are unfamiliar with international law. It is merely to point out that 
the number of sitting U.S. judges who are well-versed in the intricacies of 
international law is quite small. Because the vast majority of claims sound-
ing in international law are resolved in the lower federal courts, this lack of 
expertise will inevitably impact the quality of the international law deci-
sions rendered by these courts, particularly when those cases present novel 
or challenging issues.113  
This Section first considers the problem of judicial inexperience spe-
cifically as it relates to the enforcement of treaties.114 It then considers this 
problem in the context of judicial attempts to determine the content of cus-
tomary international law.115 
1. Treaties 
When it comes to treaties, judicial inexperience manifests itself in 
three primary ways. First, U.S. courts sometimes overlook treaties that are 
relevant in a particular case. Second, these courts are sometimes reluctant to 
apply the treaty because they are unfamiliar with international legal meth-
ods. Third, inexperience with international legal sources sometimes leads 
these same courts to misinterpret these treaties. 
The CISG provides an excellent example of the tendency among some 
U.S. judges to overlook international treaties. U.S. litigants and jurists rou-
tinely fail to recognize that the CISG displaces Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code with respect to contracts involving the international sale 
                                                                                                                           
 112 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint, 358 F.3d 288, 306 (3d Cir. 2004) (Roth, J., concurring) 
(stating that few judges have any experience in the field of international law); Flores v. S. Peru 
Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he relevant evidence of customary inter-
national law is . . . generally unfamiliar to lawyers and judges.”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 307 F.2d 845, 860 (2d Cir. 1962), rev’d, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (“Judges of municipal 
courts, the bulk of whose decisions involve questions under a domestic law derived from a long-
established and increasingly elaborate national legal system, will often find themselves unfamiliar 
with the ratiocination necessary for decision in this area [of international law], where recognized 
precedent and accepted authority are scant.”). 
 113 See Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs, 61 DUKE L.J. 941, 950 
(2012) (observing that the federal courts of appeal “create the vast bulk of precedents on interna-
tional law”); Janet Chiancone et al., Issues in Resolving Cases of International Child Abduction by 
Parents, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, Dec. 2001, at 7, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf
files1/ojjdp/190105.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/KTN3-3CLF (reporting that “[n]early two-
thirds of responding parents reported that a judge’s inexperience in dealing with international 
abduction cases was a major obstacle in the search for and recovery of their child” and that “three-
fifths of U.S. judges had handled either no international parental abduction cases or just one 
case”).  
 114 See infra notes 116–130 and accompanying text. 
 115 See infra notes 131–150 and accompanying text. 
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of goods.116 The CISG is referenced in every modern contracts casebook, its 
text is easily accessible via the Internet, and commentaries on it may be 
found in many courthouse libraries. 117 Litigants and judges nevertheless 
frequently overlook it.118 When this occurs, U.S. courts apply state contract 
law—not the treaty—to resolve these disputes.119 
U.S. judges also sometimes shy away from applying treaties because 
they are unfamiliar with them. A federal district court judge based in Gal-
veston, Texas, for example, once transferred a complex international law 
case to another federal district because he felt that he lacked experience 
with international law. 120 This judge observed that “the capacity of this 
Court to address the complex and sophisticated issues of international law 
and foreign relations presented by this case is dwarfed by that of its es-
teemed colleagues in the District of Columbia” and that he could not “think 
of a Bench better versed and more capable of handling precisely this type of 
case, which requires a high level of expertise in international matters.”121 
Although this decision is perhaps somewhat anomalous in its frankness, 
there are other cases in which U.S. judges with limited experience in the 
field of international law have sought out reasons to avoid having to adjudi-
cate such cases on the merits.122 Indeed, a number of scholars have argued 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See, e.g., Simar Shipping Ltd. v. Global Fishing, Inc., 540 Fed. Appx. 565, 567 (9th Cir. 
2013) (rejecting argument that the lower court “committed reversible legal error in not applying or 
even mentioning the [CISG]” where it should have been applied); Att’ys Trust v. Videotape Com-
puter Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 600 (9th Cir. 1996) (failing completely to address the CISG’s 
application); GPL Treatment, Ltd. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 894 P.2d 470, 477 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 
1996) (Lesson, J., dissenting) (noting that the trial court erred in applying the Uniform Commer-
cial Code rather than the CISG). 
 117 See William S. Dodge, Teaching the CISG in Contracts, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 72, 76 (2000). 
Although most contracts casebooks discuss the CISG, few devote any substantial time to it. Id.  
 118 See id. at 74 (“American law schools appear to be graduating students who have no famili-
arity with the CISG and who, as a result, are not properly equipped to serve their clients.”); cf. M. 
Margaret McKeown, Celebrating Women on the High Seas—in Admiralty Law and Otherwise, 45 
J. MAR. L. & COM. 119, 119 (2014) (“I admit to never having heard of COGSA before this ap-
peal.”). 
 119 See James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International Sales, 32 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 273, 284 (1999) (“Since no provision in the treaty identifies the treaty as self-executing 
and since the treaty is not easily located within the U.S. Code, this uniform law which preempts 
the UCC in the area of international sales remains both hidden and unknown to courts and practi-
tioners.” (footnote omitted)); Kina Grbic, Comment, Putting the CISG Where It Belongs: In the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 29 TOURO L. REV. 173, 175 (2012) (“[M]any United States courts 
erroneously fail to apply the CISG in situations in which its application is appropriate, even man-
dated by law.”). 
 120 Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009–10 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
 121 Id. at 1009. 
 122 See Peter L. Fitzgerald, The International Contracting Practices Survey Project, 27 J.L. & 
COM. 1, 17–19 (2008) (noting view among foreign practitioners that U.S. judges were “reluctant” 
to apply the CISG in some cases); McFadden, supra note 9, at 38 (“It should not surprise us that 
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in recent years that U.S. courts are making aggressive use of existing doc-
trinal rules to avoid reaching the merits in cases exhibiting some connection 
to a foreign jurisdiction.123 
Even in cases where treaties are given effect by U.S. courts, judicial 
inexperience sometimes leads them to misinterpret particular provisions.124 
The Third and Eleventh Circuits, for example, have repeatedly (and incor-
rectly) held that certain bilateral treaties require U.S. courts to accord full 
faith and credit to foreign judgments.125 The Second Circuit has evidenced 
an “abysmal” understanding of the principle of national treatment in inter-
national copyright conventions.126 And the Eleventh Circuit has read the 
text of the Paris Convention specifically to address the issue of self-
execution when, in fact, that treaty does not address that issue.127 In each 
case, a lack of familiarity with international sources led the court to inter-
pret a particular treaty provision in a way that was not just debatable but 
objectively incorrect. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has a similarly checkered record when it 
comes to treaty interpretation. The Court’s characterization of the Hague 
Evidence Convention in its 1987 Aerospatiale opinion, for example, has 
been described as a “caricature.”128 Other scholars have suggested that the 
                                                                                                                           
men and women of practical affairs are reluctant to pursue a line of analysis about which they 
know little, which is seldom brought to their attention, whose mastery requires a substantial in-
vestment of time, and whose ultimate usefulness is open to question.”). 
 123 See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.  
 124 See, e.g., William P. Johnson, Understanding Exclusion of the CISG: A New Paradigm of 
Determining Party Intent, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 213, 215 (2011) (“[T]here is a widespread and grow-
ing body of U.S. jurisprudence propagating imprecise and incorrect analysis of the CISG and its 
effective exclusion.”). 
 125 See Otos Tech Co. v. OGK Am., Inc., 653 F.3d 310, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2011); Daewoo Motor 
Am., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 459 F.3d 1249, 1259 (11th Cir. 2006); Sik Choi v. Hyung Soo Kim, 
50 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1995); Vagenas v. Cont’l Gin Co., 988 F.2d 104, 107 (11th Cir. 1993); 
John F. Coyle, Friendship Treaties ≠ Judgments Treaties, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
49, 49 (2013), http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=mlr_fi, 
archived at https://perma.cc/M2QY-RQSX?type=pdf. 
 126 William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 396 
(2000); see Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 
1998); Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 290–91 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 127 Int’l Cafe, S.A.L., v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1277 n.5 (11th 
Cir. 2001); Sloss, supra note 91, at 529.  
 128 George A. Bermann, The Hague Evidence Convention in the Supreme Court: A Critique of 
the Aérospatiale Decision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 525, 539, 542 (1989); see James G. Dwyer & Lois A. 
Yurow, Taking Evidence and Breaking Treaties: Aérospatiale and the Need for Common Sense, 
21 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 439, 460–72 (1988) (criticizing the majority opinion as “both 
analytically and practically unsound”); Russell J. Weintraub, The Need for Awareness of Interna-
tional Standards When Construing Multilateral Conventions: The Arbitration, Evidence, and 
Service Conventions, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441, 456–61 (1993). See generally Société Nationale 
Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (discussing the Hague 
Evidence Convention’s history and application). 
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Court is “deeply reluctant to rely on humanitarian law treaties and does so 
rarely, haphazardly, and minimally, eschewing comprehensive analysis of 
the text, structure, and history of the relevant provisions.”129 The Court’s 
interpretation of the Warsaw Convention in six cases decided between 1984 
and 1999 also exhibited a multitude of problems. As one scholar has ob-
served: 
The Warsaw Convention cases are hardly a model of coherent de-
velopment of international rules under a multilateral treaty. The 
Court, for example, invoked prior foreign judicial interpretations 
of the treaty when convenient and disregarded them when it did 
not like the result. It, along with the parties and the amicus United 
States, failed to note the apparent inapplicability of the Conven-
tion altogether in two of the six cases it considered. These cases 
do not, in short, provide much support for the argument that the 
Supreme Court brings special competence and insight to the reso-
lution of treaty disputes.130 
In summary, a lack of experience with international law sometimes leads 
judges to (1) overlook treaties that are on point, (2) search for ways to avoid 
rendering decisions on the merits in treaty cases, and (3) misinterpret treaty 
provisions in cases in which they are applied. 
2. Customary International Law 
 When the source of international law invoked in a particular dispute is 
international custom, the lack of judicial expertise with respect to interna-
tional legal materials becomes even more problematic.131 In the classic for-
mulation, customary international law is created by (1) state practice that is 
(2) undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation.132 In order to establish that 
a rule of customary international law exists under this test, a court must first 
survey the practice of states in order to ascertain whether these states con-
sistently act in accordance with certain rules.133 If the court determines that 
                                                                                                                           
 129 David Weissbrodt & Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, The Role of the Supreme Court in Interpreting 
and Developing Humanitarian Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1423 (2011). 
 130 Paul B. Stephan, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1946–2000, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 45, at 317, 347 (footnotes 
omitted); see Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 312–14 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 131 Setear, supra note 77, at 671 (“The difficulties of interpreting customary law make even 
the challenges of interpreting treaty law seem relatively unproblematic.”). 
 132  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102(2) (1987); CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 24–27. 
 133 See CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 26; A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and Interna-
tional Law, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1475, 1485–88 (2003) (discussing the traditional ap-
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there is substantial evidence of consistent state practice, it must then seek to 
determine whether these states act in this way out of a sense of legal obliga-
tion.134 If there is no evidence of consistent state practice, or if there is evi-
dence of such practice but no proof that the practice is undertaken out of a 
sense of legal obligation, then there exists no binding rule of customary in-
ternational law under the classic test.135 
The process by which customary international law is created has no 
obvious analog in the U.S. legal system. In addition, U.S. courts generally 
lack expertise in determining the precise nature of state practice because the 
judges possess only limited capacity to engage in fact-finding as to the ac-
tual behavior of states. In 2003, the Second Circuit acknowledged these 
limitations in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp. when it observed that 
“the relevant evidence of customary international law is . . . generally un-
familiar to lawyers and judges” and that “[t]hese difficulties are compound-
ed by the fact that customary international law . . . does not stem from any 
single, definitive, readily-identifiable source.”136 In light of these challeng-
es, U.S. courts often seek to avoid applying customary international law. 
One study found, for example, that approximately eighty percent of cases 
brought under the ATS and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) be-
tween 1980 and 2004 were decided without reaching the issue of whether 
the conduct in question violated international law.137 U.S. courts have also 
consistently refused to apply customary international law as a rule of deci-
sion in cases outside the ATS context.138 Whenever possible, in short, U.S. 
courts seek to avoid reaching the merits of claims sounding in customary 
international law. 
                                                                                                                           
proach applied by U.S. courts for determining customary law); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. 677, 711–25 (1900) (devoting 14 pages of opinion to survey of existing state practice). 
 134 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23–26 
(2005) (criticizing modern scholars and commentators for paying too little regard to this require-
ment). 
 135 Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 
1566 (1984) (“The process by which customary law is created is hardly certain and remains 
somewhat mysterious. Courts are often reluctant to conclude that a principle has become custom-
ary law, and they may be even more reluctant to do so when the principle would be contrary to 
earlier congressional legislation.”). 
 136 414 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2003); see Van Alstine, supra note 113, at 996–97 (“The 
absence of an authoritative text; the complicated and unfamiliar lawmaking processes; and the 
linguistic, cultural, and legal differences among the participants combine to increase substantially 
the ‘open texture’ of this form of judicially enforceable law.” (footnote omitted)). 
 137 See K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and Structural Reasonableness, 40 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 1, 2 (2004) (“Based on a review of over ninety human rights cases brought [under the ATS 
and the TVPA] since 1980, approximately eighty percent have been dismissed based on [various 
affirmative defenses and procedural requirements].”). 
 138 See supra note 65 (collecting cases).  
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There are, however, cases in which U.S. courts must apply customary 
international law. Judicial practice in this area has, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
been subjected to withering academic criticism. One common complaint is 
that U.S. courts will often look to secondary sources that purport to describe 
state practice accurately rather than looking to state practice itself.139 One 
scholar has argued, for example, that “the approach U.S. courts have taken 
in determining the content of international law is fundamentally flawed” in 
that these courts “base[] their legal conclusions on sources that cannot gen-
erate legal rules, and which . . . misstate[] the content of state practice.”140 
In a similar vein, another commenter noted that “courts rarely attempt any 
direct or systematic inquiry into the attitude of states about a customary 
practice.”141 Whatever weaknesses that U.S. courts may exhibit in interpret-
ing international treaties, in other words, these weaknesses are even more 
manifest when it comes to determining the content of customary interna-
tional law. This issue arises because, in the latter case, there is often, quite 
literally, no text from which it is possible to derive the existence of any le-
gal rule.142 
In light of these challenges, some commentators have urged courts to 
jettison the traditional approach for determining customary international 
law in favor of a “modern” approach. Whereas traditional custom is “identi-
fied through an inductive process in which a general custom is derived from 
specific instances of state practice,” modern custom is “derived by a deduc-
tive process that begins with general statements of rules rather than particu-
lar instances of practice.”143 A court seeking to determine modern custom, 
for example, would look not to the actual practice of states but rather to 
                                                                                                                           
 139 This behavior is akin to looking for one’s lost keys beneath a streetlight because that is the 
only place where one can see well enough to look. 
 140 Weisburd, supra note 133, at 1478, 1503; see id. at 1529 (urging U.S. courts called upon 
to determine the content of customary international law to consult “extensive collections of the 
actual practice of states regarding human rights, published frequently by trustworthy organiza-
tions”); see also Michael D. Ramsey, The Empirical Dilemma of International Law, 41 SAN DIE-
GO L. REV. 1243, 1259 (2004) (arguing for U.S. courts to be more rigorous in determining exist-
ence and content of customary international law); Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International 
Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 32 (1988) (same). 
 141 J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 469 
(2000); see Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 665, 709 (1986) (arguing that U.S. courts “cannot readily make judgments about changed 
international circumstances” and therefore “lack an institutional capacity to participate fully in the 
development of customary international law”). 
 142 See Daniel Abebe, Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation for Federal Incorporation and 
International Human Rights Litigation, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 45 (2007) (“[T]he federal judiciary 
is not best suited to determine amorphous, indeterminate new CIL norms on a case-by-case ba-
sis.”). 
 143 Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary Internation-
al Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 757 (2001). 
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“multilateral treaties and declarations by international fora such as the Gen-
eral Assembly . . . .”144  
Although modern custom is clearly easier for judges to administer than 
traditional custom in that it requires them to canvas legal texts rather than 
determine the nature of (often unwritten) state practice, it is “descriptively 
inaccurate because it reflects ideal, rather than actual, standards of con-
duct.”145 In the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the 
question, it made clear that the traditional test for determining the existence 
of such law should remain the touchstone of the analysis for courts in the 
United States.146 Nevertheless, advocates who wish to expand the scope of 
customary international law rules often (strategically) blur the differences 
between the two approaches. The upshot is that U.S. judges with little to no 
background knowledge of international law are often asked to determine the 
content of an amorphous and contested body of law whose content may 
vary depending upon one’s methodological approach.147 
Given these challenges, it is unsurprising that the customary interna-
tional law rules recognized by U.S. courts do not always correspond to the 
customary international law rules recognized by international tribunals. 
Customary international law is “plagued by debates and uncertainties about 
its proper sources, its content, its usefulness, and its normative attractive-
ness.” 148  Moreover, the context in which this inquiry often occurs—
litigation under the ATS—is so idiosyncratic as to defy attempts to extrapo-
late rules derived in connection with it to other contexts. As one scholar has 
observed: 
[T]he jurisprudence of the US courts applying the ATS is not 
merely internationally agreed substantive international law plus 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 769. 
 146 See John O. McGinnis, Sosa and the Derivation of Customary International Law, in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 45, at 
481, 487 (observing that the Sosa Court “endorse[d] . . . a relatively strict positivist approach to-
ward customary international law rather than the looser approaches sometimes advocated in the 
modern era”). 
 147 See Kedar S. Bhatia, Comment, Reconsidering the Purely Jurisdictional View of the Alien 
Tort Statute, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 447, 504 (2013) (“Whether the fault lies with the statute 
itself, the subject-matter, or with the actors interpreting it, courts are struggling with the sophisti-
cated analysis required to discern the intricacies of customary international law.” (footnote omit-
ted)); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. Common 
Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 255 (observing that where a rule of 
customary international law is unsettled, there arise “difficult issues concerning the institutional 
competence of U.S. courts to interpret and apply [customary international law]”). 
 148 Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Mandatory Versus Default Rules: How Can Customary 
International Law Be Improved?, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 421, 421 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.
org/forum/mandatory-versus-default-rules-how-can-customary-international-law-be-improved, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/4Y6E-JDRF. 
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some US civil litigation concepts . . . . It is, instead, an interpreta-
tion of ‘international law’ filtered through an ancient US statute, 
with US canons of constitutional interpretation applied to the 
meaning of the statute and only by extension to the ‘international’ 
law underlying it. . . . [M]any international law experts are, on the 
one hand, reassured to see American courts involve themselves 
with substantive international law, gradually drawing it into 
American jurisprudence and adjudication. On the other hand, I 
suspect many of them are also privately unhappy with the actual 
content of that law, thinking that it is evolving within its closed 
community in ways which are not consistent with the ‘authorita-
tive’ interpretation of international law in the international com-
munity and which are, in a word, weird.149 
In summary, given the unique interpretive challenges posed by customary 
international law, and the fact that most U.S. judges lack experience with 
this law, it is not at all clear that its direct application by U.S. judges will 
consistently result in the faithful domestic application of customary interna-
tional rules.150 
III. THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF DIRECT APPEALS TO THE JUDICIARY 
In response to the attitudinal and experiential obstacles that have led 
U.S. judges to retreat from international law, internationalist legal scholars 
have advanced a number of proposals that seek to give international law a 
more prominent role in the U.S. legal system.151 First, they have argued that 
U.S. judges should relax—or even cast aside altogether—the doctrinal rules 
that often serve to impede the direct application of international law in U.S. 
courts.152 Second, they have encouraged U.S. judges to familiarize them-
selves with international norms in the hopes that acculturation will lead to a 
softening of judicial attitudes toward those norms.153 Third, they have sug-
                                                                                                                           
 149 Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended 
Consequences, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 331, 350–51 (2009). 
 150 See Celé Hancock, The Incompatibility of the Juvenile Death Penalty and the United Na-
tion’s Convention on the Rights of the Child: Domestic and International Concerns, 12 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. LAW 699, 721 (1995) (“American courts may be reluctant to utilize customary 
international law because they are traditionally and structurally ill-equipped to effectively deal 
with the subject. In the framework of customary international law, they have little experience from 
which to draw.” (footnote omitted)). 
 151 As discussed above, this outcome is normatively desirable because it would (1) make it 
possible for certain disputes sounding in international law to be adjudicated where no forum 
would otherwise exist, and (2) give U.S. courts the ability to exercise a greater degree of control 
over the development of international law rules. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.  
 152 See infra notes 155–166 and accompanying text.  
 153 See infra notes 167–174 and accompanying text.  
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gested that U.S. judges should receive more extensive training into the 
methods and content of international law in order to counterbalance their 
inexperience in dealing with international law and its sources.154 
Each of these proposals, it should be emphasized, is couched as an ap-
peal to the U.S. judiciary. The internationalists have, in short, generally 
sought to give international law a greater role in domestic litigation by per-
suading U.S. judges to reform their doctrine, rethink their attitudes, and re-
acquaint themselves with the basics of international law. To date, however, 
these appeals do not appear to have had much of an impact on judicial prac-
tice. 
A. Doctrinal Liberalization 
The internationalists have long sought to persuade U.S. courts to liber-
alize those doctrines that currently make it difficult to give direct effect to 
international law in the U.S. legal system. Louis Henkin once suggested, for 
example, that the last-in-time rule should be abandoned and that treaties 
should always trump inconsistent statutes. 155 Carlos Vazquez has argued 
that all treaties should be presumptively self-executing.156 David Sloss has 
argued that declarations of non-self-execution by the political branches are 
unconstitutional.157 Sital Kalantry has urged courts to adopt a more liberal 
approach to determining whether a particular treaty gives rise to a private 
right of action.158 David Bederman encouraged judges to refrain from in-
voking the political question doctrine when adjudicating claims involving 
treaty rights. 159  Derek Jenks and Neal Katyal have argued that judges 
should be less deferential to executive interpretations of international law.160 
And a number of internationalist scholars—including Harold Koh, Beth 
Stephens, and Ryan Goodman—have asserted that customary international 
                                                                                                                           
 154 See infra notes 175–179 and accompanying text.  
 155 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 210–11 (1996); cf. Rich-
ard B. Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 9, 50 (1970) (advancing a similar argument). 
 156 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2157–58 
(1999). But see David H. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-
Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 32, 32–33 (2009), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/pdfs/moore.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QA94-KY3D (challenging this argument). 
 157 See David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 45–70 (2002). 
 158 See Sital Kalantry, The Intent-to-Benefit: Individually Enforceable Rights Under Interna-
tional Treaties, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 63, 99 (2008) (stating that the “test suggested by this article is 
more likely than the statutory approach to lead courts to find that certain treaties create rights in 
favor of certain individuals that are enforceable by those individuals in a U.S. court”). 
 159 See Bederman, supra note 94, at 1488. 
 160 Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1230, 1235 (2007). 
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law is a form of federal common law that the federal courts can (and 
should) look to on a more regular basis.161 
The internationalist assault on these limiting doctrinal rules has, in 
short, been fierce and unrelenting. This assault, moreover, began decades 
ago. Almost forty years ago, Louis Henkin argued that the political question 
doctrine should rarely (if ever) be applied by courts considering cases 
touching on international law or foreign affairs.162 More than fifty years 
ago, Thomas Franck argued that the courts were overly deferential to the 
executive branch when it came to cases involving the correct interpretation 
of international law. 163  These scholarly efforts to bring about doctrinal 
change have not, however, had much of an effect. Instead, U.S. courts con-
tinue to apply regularly all of these limiting doctrines.164 Indeed, to the ex-
tent that a trend is discernible, it appears that these doctrines are even more 
vigorously enforced today than in years past.165 The ironic culmination of 
decades of scholarship urging U.S. judges to give direct effect to interna-
tional law in its various manifestations, in short, is a judiciary that is in-
crasingly reluctant even to cite to international sources.166 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human 
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 497–513 (1997); Harold Hongju 
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1857 (1998); Stephens, 
supra note 39, at 460–61.  
 162 Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 622 (1976) 
(arguing that “the ‘political question’ doctrine . . . is an unnecessary, deceptive packaging of sev-
eral established doctrines that has misled lawyers and courts to find in it things that were never put 
there”). 
 163 Franck, supra note 94, at 1123 (arguing that “there is no reason for the courts to abdicate 
their function . . . in those cases in which there is at stake no matter of international law substan-
tially affecting the national interest”). 
 164 See Wuerth, supra note 18, at 119 (“Many would like the courts to use treaty self-
execution and customary international law in a sense as the better angels of ourselves to judicially 
enforce normatively desirable international law, even when not clearly authorized to do so by the 
political branches. The Court has shied away from this approach . . . .”). 
 165 In Medellín v. Texas, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a test for determin-
ing whether a treaty was self-executing that was arguably stricter than the one most U.S. courts 
had previously applied. See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing 
Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 540 (2008) (“[T]he [Medellín] Court implicitly rejected the 
argument . . . that there should be a strong presumption in favor of treaty self-execution.”); David 
H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against Treaties?: Equivalence, Duality, and Non-Self-
Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228, 2229 (2010) (suggesting that “Medellín arguably . . . en-
dorsed a broad notion of non-self-execution”); John Quigley, A Tragi-Comedy of Errors Erodes 
Self-Execution of Treaties: Medellín v. Texas and Beyond, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 403, 415–
17 (2012). 
 166 See infra note 220 and accompanying text. (citing anecdotal evidence that some judges 
now seek to avoid citing to international law). 
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B. Socialization and Acculturation 
The internationalists have also long sought to persuade U.S. courts to 
familiarize themselves with international law so that it will seem less exotic 
and unwelcome when courts are called upon to apply it. Peter Spiro has ar-
gued, for example, that as U.S. courts “become increasingly socialized to 
international norms . . . [they] are also likely to be increasingly receptive to 
the incorporation of international law.”167 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jenks 
have argued that the process of socializing state actors to international law 
norms has the potential to improve state compliance with human rights trea-
ties.168 And Anne-Marie Slaughter has famously suggested that judges from 
around the world are increasingly engaged in transnational judicial dialogue 
through which they learn about foreign and international law from their 
counterparts in other nations.169 Once these judges are exposed to interna-
tional norms and have conversed with their international counterparts, so 
these arguments go, their resistance to international law will soften.170 
To date, however, these calls to socialize U.S. judges to international 
law norms do not appear to have significantly altered judicial attitudes. 
There are several possible reasons why. First, these acculturation efforts 
have historically been conducted on a relatively small scale. Although some 
international law organizations have intermittently sought to familiarize 
U.S. judges with international law norms, there has been no comprehensive 
attempt to persuade judges who are skeptical of international law that they 
should rethink their position.171 Second, many of the projects that have the 
                                                                                                                           
 167 Peter J. Spiro, Wishing International Law Away, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 23, 24–25 (2009), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/wishing-international-law-away, archived at http://perma.cc/
P9NB-4MCA; see Spiro, supra note 48, at 321 (2013) (“As American judges more closely identi-
fy as members of the international community of courts, they too have been socialized in interna-
tional norms.” (footnote omitted)). 
 168 RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JENKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–17 (2013); see David Sloss, Book Review, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 
576, 581 (2014) (arguing that “the acculturative force of the [UN] Charter’s anti-discrimination 
norm . . . exert[ed] an indirect influence over legal and constitutional developments in the United 
States [in the 1950s and 1960s]”). 
 169  See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2004); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 193 (2003). 
 170 See infra notes 167–169 and accompanying text. But see Abebe & Posner, supra note 80, 
at 546 (critiquing this argument). 
 171 One organization that seeks to encourage dialogue between U.S. judges and their foreign 
and international counterparts is the Committee on International Judicial Relations, whose official 
mandate is to “coordinate the federal judiciary’s relationship with foreign judiciaries and with 
official and unofficial agencies and organizations interested in international judicial relations.” See 
Committee on International Judicial Relations, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (Oct 2002), http://www.fjc.
gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/IJR00012.pdf/$file/IJR00012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EA74-CS9S. 
This organization regularly arranges for U.S. judges to travel to foreign nations and helps to bring 
foreign jurists to the United States. Id. At least one scholar has suggested that by bringing U.S. 
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potential to bring about these changes are entirely voluntary. The judges 
who are most likely to volunteer to be socialized to international norms by 
participating in workshops sponsored by the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, for example, are precisely the judges who are least likely to re-
quire acculturation to these same norms. 
The third and final possible reason why calls for socialization do not 
appear to have had a meaningful effect is that those elected officials who 
strongly oppose the use of international law by U.S. courts tend to care far 
more deeply about this issue than the elected officials who favor it. Con-
servative legislators at both the state and federal levels have in recent years 
proposed legislation formally barring U.S. judges from citing to interna-
tional or foreign legal sources in their opinions.172 Certain members of the 
U.S. Senate have successfully opposed the confirmation of judicial nomi-
nees on the grounds that they are too open to using international law expan-
sively in judicial decision-making.173 To the extent that a federal district 
court judge aspires to be promoted to serve on the courts of appeal, there-
fore, that judge is unlikely to make extensive use of international law in her 
judicial opinions for fear that such use may engender opposition. For the 
same reasons, a federal appeals court judge who dreams of someday serving 
on the U.S. Supreme Court is also likely to shy away from invitations to 
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Judicial Independence: Some Observations, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1071 (2006) (discussing 
federal legislation). 
 173 See Chris Casteel, Sen. Tom Coburn Blocked Attempt to Fill Federal Appeals Court Vacancy, 
Oklahoma Attorneys Say, NEWSOK.COM (Sept. 12, 2011), http://newsok.com/sen.-tom-coburn-
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custom_click=headlines_widget, archived at http://perma.cc/6SAQ-LQ8W (“Sen. Tom Coburn shot 
down the impending nomination of the dean of the University of Tulsa law school for the vacant seat 
on the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, according to Oklahoma attorneys who said Coburn was 
concerned about Janet Levit’s background in international law.”); Nathan Koppel, Goodwin Liu and 
Other Judicial Nominees Fail to Win Confirmation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.
com/law/2010/12/23/goodwin-liu-and-other-judicial-nominees-fail-to-win-confirmation/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/8RF7-D33X?type=pdf (“Liu faced particular scrutiny from Republicans due to his 
supposed liberal leanings, including his writings supporting the use of international law in judicial 
rulings . . . .”). 
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make creative arguments grounded in international law. Any attempt to so-
cialize judges to international legal norms must, in other words, account for 
the existence of countervailing forces that discourage the open expression 
of sympathy for those same norms.174 To date, these countervailing forces 
appear to have been stronger than the push for greater acculturation. 
C. Education 
Internationalist legal scholars have also urged all U.S. lawyers to be-
come better acquainted with international law as a means of redressing the 
problem of judicial inexperience. 175 One commentator, for example, has 
proposed that (1) all U.S. law students be required to take a course in inter-
national law, (2) international law questions be added to the bar examina-
tion, (3) bar associations and other similar groups be persuaded to offer 
more continuing legal education courses in international law, and (4) annual 
conferences be convened at which U.S. judges and others may learn more 
about international law.176 The goal of this and other similar proposals is not 
so much to encourage U.S. judges to apply international law in the first in-
stance—though it may incidentally help to achieve this goal—but instead to 
ensure that U.S. judges called upon to interpret international law do so ex-
pertly, impartially, and in a manner that takes into account the law’s interna-
tional origins. 
It is difficult to take issue with any proposal that calls for the better ed-
ucation of judges and lawyers. Nor is it easy to quarrel with the efforts that 
various organizations have made in order to advance this project specifical-
ly with respect to international law. At the end of the day, however, it is not 
clear that these efforts have had a meaningful impact on judicial practice. 
International law cases are today—and have long been—relatively rare. In 
many jurisdictions, it is unlikely that a judge will see more than a handful of 
such cases over the course of his or her career. Accordingly, most judges 
have little reason to develop expertise in this particular area of law. In addi-
                                                                                                                           
 174 It is probably not a coincidence that those judges who are most willing to adopt expansive 
readings of international law are senior judges who do not aspire to promotion within the federal 
judiciary. See, e.g., Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1110 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (Reinhardt, J., 
concurring); Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 596–603 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (Weinstein, J.), 
rev’d sub nom. Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 175 See Davis, supra note 104, at 383–84 (“While these uses of transnational law are tradition-
al and widely accepted, it may be the case that some judges avoid using transnational law because 
they are not sufficiently familiar with its sources—a problem that is already being remedied 
through judicial education.”); McFadden, supra note 9, at 39–40 (“Lack of knowledge and lack of 
seasoning have straightforward antidotes: education and practice.”); Sylvester, supra note 104, at 
620 (“If the United States judiciary is ignorant of international law, then education is the answer, 
not abandonment of the judicial function.”). 
 176 McFadden, supra note 9, at 63–64. 
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tion, most U.S. law schools still do not require that their students learn the 
basics of international law; only nine percent of law schools ranked in the 
top one hundred by U.S. News and World Report currently require their 
students to take an international law class prior to graduation.177 After law 
school, moreover, there is no requirement that practicing attorneys in the 
United States familiarize themselves with international law rules; no U.S. 
state currently tests the subject on its bar exam. Finally, although all newly-
appointed federal judges are encouraged to attend training programs spon-
sored by the Federal Judicial Center, the substantive areas of law covered in 
these programs do not include international law.178 At the beginning of their 
judicial careers, in other words, federal judges receive no mandatory formal 
training in the basics of international law. 
To be sure, opportunities exist for judges to acquaint themselves with 
international law rules that they were never exposed to as students, bar ap-
plicants, or newly-appointed judges. 179 It is unclear, however, whether a 
substantial number of judges will seek out these opportunities. As a result, 
many judges will likely continue to be wary of applying international law 
and will continue to struggle to interpret international law rules correctly in 
those cases in which they do arise. 
IV. THE CASE FOR STATUTES THAT INCORPORATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Although it is possible that the U.S. Supreme Court will choose to re-
visit many of its seminal decisions concerning the relationship between in-
ternational law and U.S. domestic law, that judicial ambivalence with re-
spect to international law will give way to widespread enthusiasm for it, and 
that U.S. judges will decide that the time has finally come to educate them-
                                                                                                                           
 177 In June 2014, a research assistant under the author’s supervision telephoned the registrar’s 
office at U.S. News & World Report’s top one hundred law schools to ask if the school required its 
students to take an international law class in order to receive a J.D. Only nine schools reported that 
they imposed such a requirement. Telephone Survey with Registrar’s Offices of U.S. News & 
World Reports Top One Hundred Law Schools (June 2014). These schools are Harvard Law 
School, the University of Michigan Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, the Univer-
sity of Washington School of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law, the University of Nebraska 
College of Law, the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, the Maurice A. Deane School of Law 
at Hofstra University, and the University of Tulsa. Id. Although some other schools have “per-
spectives” requirements that students may fulfill by taking international law courses, they do not 
formally mandate that their students take a course in international law prior to graduation. Id. 
 178 E-mail from a U.S. District Court Judge to author (June 17, 2014) (on file with author). 
 179 For an example of a recent publication on international law whose goal was to educate 
U.S. judges as to the workings of international law, see generally AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, 
BENCHBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014). The American Bar Association has, in the past, 
called for better education of U.S. judges with respect to international law. Judicial Education on 
International Law Committee of the Section of International Law of the American Bar Associa-
tion: Final Report, 24 INT’L LAW. 903, 914–15 (1990). 
2015] Writing International Law into the U.S. Code 469 
selves as to international law, none of these changes would appear to be 
imminent. If the goal is to ensure that international law is given a more 
prominent role in the U.S. legal system, recent history suggests that direct 
appeals to the judiciary are likely to prove largely unavailing. 
This Part argues that a more promising means of achieving this goal is to 
focus on the political branches. Specifically, it contends that the simplest and 
most straightforward means of giving existing international law rules a great-
er role in the U.S. legal system is for the political branches to incorporate 
these rules into statutes.180 Such statutes, this Part argues, offer a number of 
practical advantages over the direct application of international law by the 
courts.181 Consequently, they represent a particularly promising means of ex-
panding the role played by international law in the U.S. legal system. 
A. The Virtues of Incorporative Statutes 
Statutes that incorporate international law into the domestic law of the 
United States have a long and distinguished history. In 1789, the ATS gave 
the federal district courts jurisdiction over certain torts committed “in viola-
tion of the law of nations.”182 In 1918, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act codi-
fied the substantive provisions of a particular conservation treaty into the 
U.S. Code.183 In 1936, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act gave domestic ef-
fect to the Hague Rules, an international treaty governing the liability of 
oceanic shippers.184 In 1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act sought 
to codify, at least in part, the customary international law of sovereign im-
munity. 185 In 1987, the Genocide Convention Implementation Act wrote the 
substance of that convention into U.S. law.186 And in 2006, the Military 
Commissions Act conferred jurisdiction on military commissions to try any 
offense made punishable by the “law of war.”187 Congress is, in short, per-
fectly capable of writing international law into the U.S. Code when it wish-
es to do so, and has done precisely that on a number of occasions. 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See infra notes 182–199 and accompanying text. 
 181 See infra notes 200–221 and accompanying text. 
 182 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.  
 183 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Pub. L. No. 65-186, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended 
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2012)). 
 184 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, Pub. L. No. 74-521, 49. Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified as 
amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30701 note (2012)). 
 185 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is “a statutory regime which incorporates standards 
recognized under international law.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613; see Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New 
York, 551 U.S. 193, 199–200 (2007). 
 186 Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), Pub. L. No. 100-
606, 102 Stat. 3045 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2012)). 
 187 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 48 U.S.C.). 
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This long history notwithstanding, a number of internationalist schol-
ars have maintained that although incorporative statutes may be useful in 
facilitating the use of international law by U.S. courts, they are not strictly 
necessary because courts can and should give direct effect to treaties and 
customary international law.188 U.S. judges are, however, often reluctant to 
give effect to international law directly.189 These same judges are, by con-
trast, more than willing to give effect to international law rules once those 
rules are incorporated into statutes.190 Indeed, statutory incorporation seems 
to function as a sort of magic elixir when it comes to the willingness of U.S. 
judges to apply international law in domestic litigation.191 Although the en-
actment of an incorporative statute will not absolutely guarantee that a par-
ticular international law rule will be given domestic effect, it will go a long 
way towards achieving this end. 
If various international law rules were to be written comprehensively 
into the U.S. Code, for example, this legislative act would eliminate many 
of the doctrinal impediments that currently complicate the ability of U.S. 
judges to enforce international law directly. It would, for example, make it 
less likely that the last-in-time rule would result in a treaty being displaced 
by a statute.192 It would render the question of whether a treaty is or is not 
self-executing irrelevant.193 It would give the political branches an oppor-
tunity to specify whether a particular treaty does or does not provide for a 
private right of action and also to specify whether certain other judicial doc-
trines (such as the act of state doctrine) should apply.194 Writing customary 
international law rules into statutes would, moreover, elevate these rules to 
the status of legislation within the domestic legal hierarchy and, in so doing, 
would make it more difficult for them to be displaced by a subsequent ex-
ecutive or legislative act. Although systemic statutory incorporation would 
not eliminate every doctrinal barrier to applying international law, it would 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See supra note 44 (collecting sources). 
 189 See supra notes 72–150 and accompanying text. 
 190 See supra note 20 (collecting cases). 
 191 Weissbrodt & Nesbitt, supra note 129, at 1422–23 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court 
“is profoundly reluctant to root its holdings in humanitarian law treaties” and that “it is the incor-
poration of the law of war into domestic statute that occasions the Court’s most extensive analysis 
of [international humanitarian law]”). 
 192 See supra note 70–71 and accompanying text (discussing the last-in-time rule). 
 193 See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text (describing the debate regarding self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties). 
 194 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2012) (“[N]o court in the United States shall decline on 
the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect 
to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is 
asserted . . . based upon . . . a confiscation or other taking . . . by an act of that state in violation of 
the principles of international law . . . .”). 
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make it far more likely that U.S. judges would reach the merits when inter-
national law issues arise in domestic litigation. 
The incorporation of international law rules into U.S. statutes would 
also have a positive impact on judicial attitudes. To a significant extent, 
U.S. judges today are wary of enforcing international law in the absence of 
clear authorization to do so from the political branches.195 Indeed, on a 
number of occasions U.S. courts have specifically requested guidance from 
the political branches as to whether a particular rule of international law 
should be applied.196 Writing international law rules into domestic statutes 
constitutes a clear and unambiguous signal from the political branches that 
judges should enforce those rules. To the extent that U.S. judges have his-
torically evidenced a preference for domestic sources over international 
ones, moreover, incorporating international law into statutes would address 
that concern by formally transforming particular international rules into 
domestic law. 
Finally, statutory incorporation would also help to remedy the problem 
of judicial inexperience. This process would transfer legal rules from a body 
of law with which U.S. judges are often unfamiliar (treaties and internation-
al custom) to a body of law with which they are quite familiar (statutes). To 
the extent that judges seek to avoid reaching the merits in international law 
cases because they lack any experience with such law, writing these rules 
into statutes may help to alleviate these anxieties. To the extent that custom-
ary international law is “plagued by debates and uncertainties about its 
proper sources, its content, its usefulness, and its normative attractive-
ness,”197 then the move by the political branches to clearly identify which 
customary international law rules should be given legal effect in the United 
States by writing the substance of these rules into domestic statutes would 
greatly facilitate the ability of U.S. judges to give them effect. Although 
statutory incorporation would not solve the problem of judicial inexperience 
entirely—it would, for example, have only a negligible impact on the pro-
cess of treaty interpretation because judges would be interpreting the same 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See Weissbrodt & Nesbitt, supra note 129, at 1422–23. 
 196 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (“[A]lthough we have even 
assumed competence to make judicial rules of decision of particular importance to foreign rela-
tions, such as the act of state doctrine, the general practice has been to look for legislative guid-
ance before exercising innovative authority over substantive law.” (citation omitted)); id. at 731 
(“[W]e would welcome any congressional guidance in exercising jurisdiction with such obvious 
potential to affect foreign relations [via the Alien Tort Statute] . . . .”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 453 n.14 (1964) (“The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of 
such questions [implicating international law] is a treaty or a statute of this country.”). 
 197 Bradley & Gulati, supra note 148, at 421. 
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text as before—it would address a number of issues that currently arise 
from the lack of judicial familiarity with international law.198 
This near-magical ability of incorporative statutes to change the hearts 
and minds of U.S. judges is not merely hypothetical. In case after case—
rendered consistently in decade after decade—U.S. courts have enforced 
such statutes and, in so doing, given domestic effect to the international law 
rule incorporated into the statute.199 This is not to argue that U.S. courts 
have not also given direct effect to self-executing treaties and (on rare occa-
sions) to rules of customary international law during that same time period. 
They have. It is merely to point out that incorporating more international 
law rules into statutes would make it easier for litigants to invoke those 
rules when appearing before U.S. courts.  
B. The Pragmatic Case for Focusing on the Political Branches 
In order for incorporative statutes to come into being, of course, they 
must first be enacted by Congress and signed by the President. This is no 
easy task.200 Indeed, in light of the many challenges inherent in the project 
of enacting these statutes, one might be tempted to conclude that—the ar-
guments above notwithstanding—international law advocates should focus 
their attention upon the judiciary.201 At the end of the day, however, a num-
ber of considerations—including recent history, relative institutional capaci-
ty to change course, and the tendency of U.S. courts to tack to the winds of 
public opinion—suggest that appeals to the political branches are more like-
ly to lead to success in the long term. 
Turning first to history, it is significant that the political branches have 
over the past several decades chosen to write international law rules into the 
U.S. Code on hundreds of occasions.202 In a few instances, they enacted 
                                                                                                                           
 198 The statutory codification of U.S. treaty obligations also has the potential to create new 
sets of problems, such as the possibility that courts will interpret domestic statutes in ways that 
conflict with the international treaties that inspired their creation. These potential problems—and 
some ways around them—are discussed in Part V.B.1. See infra notes 238–258 and accompanying 
text. 
 199 See supra note 20 (collecting cases). 
 200 See supra notes 206–207 and accompanying text.  
 201 See, e.g., Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and 
the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 347 (2005) (“Political activists within 
the United States, who have failed to achieve these [reformist political] goals through political 
campaigns at home, have turned their hopes to a newly autonomous globalized judiciary, through 
which they hope to secure their goals by alternative means.”). 
 202  Hathaway, supra note 25, at 1239 (“Each year, hundreds of congressional-executive 
agreements on a wide range of international legal topics are enacted by simple majorities in the 
House and Senate and signed into law by the President, outside the traditional Treaty Clause pro-
cess.”). 
2015] Writing International Law into the U.S. Code 473 
laws that incorporated rules of customary international law.203 In other cas-
es, they approved congressional-executive agreements.204 In still other cas-
es, they enacted statutes intended to implement treaties that had been ap-
proved by the Senate.205 There is, in short, ample historical precedent to 
support the conclusion that the political branches can and will enact incor-
porative statutes when it suits their purposes. This conclusion runs contrary 
to the argument that the political branches generally—and Congress in par-
ticular—are implacably hostile to international law in all its manifestations. 
One could argue, however, that legislative hostility to international law 
has increased substantially just in the past few years. The 112th and 113th 
Congresses were famously unproductive; the number of federal laws enact-
ed between 2010 and 2014 was among the lowest in U.S. history.206 In this 
political environment, one might argue, it is highly unlikely that the politi-
cal branches will agree to enact any statute whose avowed purpose is to in-
corporate international law into the U.S. legal system.207 
The problem with this argument is that it paints with too broad a brush. 
Much of the legislation opposition to “international law” in the abstract is at 
its core opposition to a particular type of that law—international human 
rights law. The same legislators who consistently speak out against the rati-
fication of human rights treaties are perfectly willing to support free trade 
agreements,208 treaties relating to the protection of intellectual property,209 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006). 
 204 For examples of these kinds of congressional-executive agreements, see generally Free Trade 
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. Kor., June 30, 
2007, available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text, availa-
ble at https://perma.cc/5WT6-UGSX; Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., 
May 18, 2004, available at https:////ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-fta/
final-text, archived at https://perma.cc/6ZSH-A95W. 
 205 Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-211, 126 Stat. 1527 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 206 Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2085 
(2013) (observing that although “it is true that, at least by some measures, the 112th Congress was 
historically unproductive . . . the 111th Congress was historically productive”); Morgan Little, 
Congress Set to Pass Historically Few Laws in 2013, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2013, http://articles.
latimes.com/2013/dec/11/news/la-pn-congress-few-laws-2013-20131211, archived at https://perma.
cc/J9UD-BZAV?type=image. 
 207 See Abebe & Posner, supra note 80, at 535–38 (arguing that Congress is a less active pro-
ponent of international law than is the executive branch); Note, The Charming Betsy Canon, Sepa-
ration of Powers, and Customary International Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1215, 1218 (2008) (stat-
ing that “the reality [is] that Congress is either at times unaware of international law or even ac-
tively hostile to it”). 
 208 See, e.g., Senate Vote 161—Passes U.S.-Korean Trade Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, http://
politics.nytimes.com/congress/votes/112/senate/1/161, archived at https://perma.cc/SR97-XQKL?
type=pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (noting that the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement was 
approved by the Senate on a vote of eighty-three to fifteen, with all but one Republican senator in 
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and international investment treaties.210 Even with respect to human rights, 
moreover, the opposition is not so implacable as one might think. The most 
recent human rights treaty considered by the Senate—the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities—received sixty-one votes in 2012.211 
One recent study found that members of Congress speak out in favor of in-
ternational law compliance far more frequently than is generally appreciat-
ed.212 Another study found that domestic debates about international law are 
often shaped as much by partisan politics as by the merits of the interna-
tional law rules in question.213 One must be careful, in short, not to assume 
that the relatively small number of legislators who speak out loudly and 
often in opposition to international law speak for the institution as a whole. 
The second consideration identified above—relative institutional ca-
pacity to change course—also cuts in favor of looking to the political 
branches rather than the judiciary. Even if there were enough members of 
Congress today to block the enactment of any and all incorporative statutes, 
this state of affairs is subject to change. Control of Congress can and does 
shift over time. If a new legislative majority wishes to pursue a policy that 
is different from that of the previous one, it is perfectly free to do so.214 The 
federal judiciary, by contrast, is far more constrained in its capacity to 
change course. Because federal judges have life tenure, the composition of 
the judiciary will ordinarily change only slowly over a period of many 
                                                                                                                           
support, and by the House on a vote of 278 to 151, with all but twenty-one Republican congress-
persons in support). 
 209 See, e.g., S. 3486 (112th): Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3486, archived at https://perma.cc/QYF2-LSKV?
type=live (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (noting that legislation to implement Patent Law Treaties was 
unanimously approved by the Senate).  
 210 See, e.g., Dep’t of State, Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, United States Senate 
Approves U.S.-Rwanda Bilateral Investment Treaty (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://m.state.
gov/md174101.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/LC6Q-NU85 (noting that the U.S.-Rwanda Bilat-
eral Investment Treaty was unanimously approved by the Senate). 
 211 See Ramsey Cox & Julian Pecquet, Senate Rejects United Nations Treaty for Disabled Rights 
in a 61–38 Vote, HILL (Dec. 4, 2012), http://thehill.com/policy/international/270831-senate-rejects-
un-treaty-for-disabled-rights-in-vote, archived at http://perma.cc/UF22-RVPN; Dennis Jett, Republi-
cations Are Blocking Ratification of Even the Most Reasonable International Treaties, NEW RE-
PUBLIC (Dec. 26, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120646/ratification-arms-trade-treaty-
others-blocked-republicans, archived at http://perma.cc/P8YN-L3JG (focusing primarily on interna-
tional human rights treaties but also mentioning the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea). 
 212 See Kevin Cope, Congress’s International Legal Discourse, 115 MICH. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015). 
 213 Jide Nzelibe, Strategic Globalization: International Law as an Extension of Domestic 
Political Conflict, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 635, 640 (2011) (observing that “instrumental partisan 
motivations” may motivate political parties to support or oppose international legal commitments).  
 214 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (citing Blackstone for the 
proposition that “one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its successors”). 
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years. In addition, the principle of stare decisis means that future judges are 
generally bound to follow decisions rendered by their predecessors.215 The 
recent decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts on topics such as treaty self-execution, private rights of action, and 
extraterritoriality will make it more difficult for litigants to invoke interna-
tional law directly in future years.216 Even if the federal judiciary were to 
become more favorably disposed to international law in the years to come, 
therefore, it is not at all clear that it would be able to easily cast aside earlier 
decisions delineating the role of international law in the U.S. legal sys-
tem.217  
Third, and finally, it is important to consider the role played by public 
opinion in shaping judicial behavior. A number of studies have shown that 
federal judges generally—and Supreme Court justices, in particular—are 
closely attuned to public opinion.218 If this is so, then it seems unlikely that 
the courts will take up the internationalist mantle so long as they perceive 
there to be substantial opposition to international law among the political 
branches. As one scholar has observed: 
[G]iven the extent to which the Supreme Court appears to work 
generally in step with public opinion, it is hard to see why the 
courts would (or successfully could) be on the leading edge with 
respect to international law when the political winds blow hard in 
the opposite direction. . . . The[] actions by the political branches 
                                                                                                                           
 215 Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (“[A]ny departure from the doctrine of stare 
decisis demands special justification.”); Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 181 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(Smith, J., concurring) (“[T]he very point of stare decisis is to forbid us from revisiting a debate 
every time there are reasonable arguments to be made on both sides.”). 
 216 See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008) (announcing a presumption that 
international agreements generally do not create private rights of action in domestic courts); 
Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 54–55 (2d Cir. 2014) (looking into 
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 217 See In re Woerner, 758 F.3d 693, 702 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[A]s a general rule, the principle of 
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Court? Possibly Yes (but We're Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 280 (2010) (conclud-
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decisions”); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. 
CT. REV. 103, 117–20; cf. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About 
Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1516 (2010) (“Supreme Court Justices care 
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see generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLU-
ENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); JEF-
FREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006). 
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may not be a perfect proxy for public opinion, but the extent to 
which the (directly) politically accountable actors in the United 
States are willing to violate, denounce, and fail to commit to wide-
ly accepted international norms cannot, in some sense, be lost on 
the Court.219 
The claim that the courts are more likely to follow—rather than to lead—
public opinion on this issue derives support from anecdotal evidence re-
layed to the author in which several federal judges were said to have con-
sciously omitted references to international law from their published deci-
sions after concluding that it wasn’t worth the blowback that these citations 
would engender.220 To the extent that federal judges are sensitive to public 
opinion, therefore, and to the extent that the views of elected officials may 
serve as a rough proxy for public opinion, it seems likely that judges will 
continue to shy away from relying directly on international law to provide a 
rule of decision until they perceive the risk of backlash to be low. A success-
ful campaign to persuade the political branches to enact statutes that give 
effect to a broader range of international law rules domestically, therefore, 
may be the best way to ensure that judges feel empowered to make greater 
use of that law in their decisions. 
*       *       * 
The foregoing argument that international law advocates should look 
to the political branches—rather than the courts—is at its core a pragmatic 
one. 221 It begins with the premise that it is normatively desirable for inter-
national law to play a more prominent role in domestic litigation. It then 
works backward to identify the most promising means of achieving this 
goal. The essential argument is that the internationalists are right that inter-
national law should play a more prominent role in domestic litigation but 
                                                                                                                           
 219 Wuerth, supra note 18, at 120. 
 220 The individuals who relayed these anecdotes to the author requested that their names not 
be used. For general support for this point of view, however, see Wuerth, supra note, at 121 (“Had 
the U.S. Supreme Court given full imprimatur to Filártiga v. Feña-Irala and subsequent ATS 
cases (especially against corporations) or had it held in Medellín that ICJ decisions are directly 
enforceable in U.S. courts, political backlash seems like a nontrivial possibility, perhaps reverber-
ating well beyond those cases themselves.”). 
 221 The argument is agnostic as to the “proper” constitutional role to be played by the respec-
tive branches of the federal government in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations and is only 
obliquely interested in the issue of relative institutional competence. On the latter point, however, 
it seems fairly clear that the relevant actors in the political branches are experts in international 
law. The Office of the Legal Advisor at the State Department is staffed by attorneys with a deep 
and abiding knowledge of international law in all its many forms. The respective staffs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are similarly well-
versed in international affairs. These individuals, working in tandem, are well-positioned to draft 
detailed legislation that incorporates international law rules into the U.S. legal system. 
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that continued appeals to the judiciary are not the best way of achieving this 
goal. The enactment of incorporative statutes represents a means of achiev-
ing the ends desired by the internationalists—more international law in U.S. 
courts—through a mechanism that addresses the concerns of a judiciary that 
has proven itself to be quite sympathetic to the structural arguments ad-
vanced by the nationalists. As such, these statutes represent a promising 
way forward when it comes to better integrating international law into the 
U.S. legal system. 
V. CONSTRUCTING THE IDEAL INCORPORATIVE STATUTE 
If incorporative statutes represent a particularly promising means of 
giving international law an expanded role in the U.S. legal system, then the 
question that naturally arises is what form these statutes should take. Should 
they transcribe international law rules into the U.S. Code? Or should they 
incorporate them by reference? Should they incorporate international law in 
a general way? Or should they incorporate specific rules of international 
law?  
This Part offers answers to each of these questions.222 In so doing, it 
seeks to provide guidance to future legislators tasked with drafting incorpo-
rative statutes. It first sets forth a typology of incorporative statutes.223 In 
constructing this typology, it draws extensively upon past congressional 
practice and on the ways in which the courts have dealt with different types 
of incorporative statutes. It then analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of 
these various approaches.224 
A. A Typology of Incorporative Statutes 
When it comes to drafting incorporative statutes, Congress has three 
distinct choices to make.225 First, it must decide whether to codify interna-
tional law or incorporate it by reference. Second, it must decide whether to 
incorporate international law generally or to incorporate specific parts of 
that law. Third, it must decide to what extent the incorporative statute 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See infra notes 223–291 and accompanying text. 
 223 See infra notes 225–235 and accompanying text. 
 224 See infra notes 236–291 and accompanying text. 
 225 See, e.g., SHAHEED FATIMA, USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS 55–77 
(2005) (providing useful overview of role played by incorporative statutes in other legal systems); 
John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655, 664–
69 (2010) (discussing different types of incorporative statutes). For simplicity, the analysis in this 
Part refers to legislation drafted by Congress rather than by the political branches acting in con-
cert. In most cases, of course, the executive will also play an important role in shaping the legisla-
tion and the consent of the executive will be required for the legislation to become law. 
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should be accompanied by other legal rules that make clear precisely when 
an individual litigant may rely on international law in domestic litigation. 
With respect to the first choice, it is necessary first to explain the dif-
ference between codifying an international law rule and incorporating the 
rule by reference. Congress codifies a rule of international law when it 
writes the substance of that rule into a statute. Codification occurs, in other 
words, when Congress acts as a transcription service that cuts language 
from a particular treaty and pastes that language into the U.S. Code. (Con-
gress codifies customary international law by writing the substance of that 
law into a statute.) Once a particular rule has been codified, it will appear—
word for word—in the text of the U.S. Code. By way of example, consider 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (“COSGA”), which reads:  
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or 
damage arising or resulting from . . . Act of God.226 
This language is identical to the language set forth in Article IV(2)(d) of the 
Hague Rules, an international treaty ratified by the United States in 1936: 
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or 
damage arising or resulting from . . . Act of God.227  
As a statute whose language tracks the language in a particular international 
treaty, COGSA codifies the Hague Rules in the U.S. Code.228 
Alternatively, Congress may choose to draft a statute that incorporates 
international law by reference. Under this approach, the international law 
rule is not formally transcribed into the U.S. Code. Instead, the statute will 
declare that certain treaties or certain rules of customary international law 
constitute a binding source of legal authority under the statute. The task of 
locating and interpreting the text of the referenced treaties—or of determin-
ing the content of the relevant rules of customary international law—is left 
to the litigants and, ultimately, to the judge. The ATS is an example of a 
statute that incorporates U.S. treaties as well as customary international law 
by reference. It provides that: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States.229 
                                                                                                                           
 226 Carriage of Goods by the Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30701 note (2012). 
 227 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to the Bills 
of Lading (The Hague Rules), art. IV, § 2(d), Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, 120 L.N.T.S. 155. 
 228 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is an example of a statute that codifies a rule of 
customary international law. See Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New 
York, 551 U.S. 193, 199–200 (2007) (observing that one purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act was the “codification of international law”). 
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In this case, Congress has not copied the language of any particular interna-
tional rule into the U.S. Code. It has merely referred a judge tasked with 
enforcing the statutory rule to the relevant international law sources and 
directed that judge to give effect to those sources in domestic litigation. 
The second choice that Congress must make in drafting incorporative 
statutes is whether to incorporate international law on a general basis or a 
specific basis. Congress incorporates international law on a general basis 
when it refers to “treaties” or to “customary international law” without 
specifying any particular treaty or any particular rule of customary interna-
tional law.230 By contrast, Congress incorporates international law on a spe-
cific basis when it refers to one particular treaty or one particular rule of 
customary international law. In the former case, the statute directs the courts 
to enforce a wide range of (unspecified) international law rules in U.S. 
courts. In the latter case, the statute directs the courts to enforce a specific 
treaty or a specific rule of customary international law. The ATS is an ex-
ample of a statute that incorporates treaties and customary international law 
on a general basis; it does not refer to any specific treaties or any specific 
rules of customary international law. The federal piracy statute, by contrast, 
is an example of a statute that incorporates a specific rule of customary in-
ternational law by reference. The statute states: 
Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as de-
fined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or 
found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.231  
The legislation that implements the New York Convention is an example of 
a statute that incorporates a specific treaty by reference. It provides: 
The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the 
grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of 
the award specified in the [New York] Convention.232 
The primary difference between a statute that incorporates international law 
rules on a general basis and a statute that does so on a specific basis, there-
                                                                                                                           
 229 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). The federal extradition statute is an example of a statute that 
incorporates treaties by reference. 18 U.S.C. § 3181(a) (2012) (“The provisions of this chapter 
relating to the surrender of persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue 
in force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government.”); see 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the . . . treaties of the United States.”). 
 230 See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 231 18 U.S.C. § 1651; see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6604, 6613 (describing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as “a statutory regime that incorpo-
rates standards recognized under international law”). 
 232 See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2012). 
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fore, is whereas the former refers to all treaties or all customary interna-
tional law without limitation, the latter purports to limit the act of incorpo-
ration to a particular subset of these same rules. 
When these two sets of binary choices are viewed in tandem, it be-
comes clear that there are four general “types” of incorporative statutes: (1) 
general codification statutes, (2) general reference statutes, (3) specific cod-
ification statutes, and (4) specific reference statutes. Table 1 illustrates how 
several existing incorporative statutes fit into each of these four categories. 
Since Congress has never attempted to codify vast swathes of international 
law in a single statute, there are no general codifications statutes in the U.S. 
Code at this time. 
 




 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (treaty) 




Alien Tort Statute (treaty & 
custom) 
Specific Reference 
 New York Convention Implementation 
Act (treaty) 
 Federal Piracy Statute (custom) 
Once it chooses among these various types of incorporative statutes, 
Congress then faces a third and final decision. It must decide whether to 
enact additional provisions that explain when and how individuals may in-
voke the newly-incorporated rules in domestic litigation.233 These addition-
al provisions may address such issues as whether a private right of action 
exists, whether the statute applies extraterritorially, or whether state and 
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear disputes arising under the 
                                                                                                                           
 233 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2012). Section 9003 states:  
Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the [Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction] for the return of a child or for 
arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access to 
a child may do so by commencing a civil action by filing a petition for the relief 
sought in any court which has jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to 
exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition 
is filed.  
Id. 
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statute.234 They may also limit (or expand) the defenses available to a de-
fendant alleged to have violated the international law rule in question.235 
B. Choosing the “Right” Type of Statute 
Having reviewed the different types of incorporative statutes that Con-
gress may choose to enact, it is useful to consider the advantages and disad-
vantages inherent in these various options. This Section first considers 
which type of incorporative statute should be used when the international 
law rule in question is set forth in a treaty.236 It then examines which type of 
statute should be used when the rule is derived from customary internation-
al law.237 
1. Treaties 
In theory, it should make no difference which drafting technique Con-
gress uses when it comes to the incorporation of international treaties be-
cause there is widespread agreement that incorporation by reference is the 
functional equivalent of statutory codification. As one author has written: 
“Incorporation by reference is at heart nothing more than a drafting tech-
nique to avoid the time and expense of setting forth all of the referenced 
language verbatim in the referencing statute, and its proper legal interpreta-
tion is just the same as if that more tedious task had in fact been done.”238 In 
practice, however, a decision to codify or incorporate by reference may im-
pact the way in which a particular treaty provision is applied and interpreted 
by U.S. courts. 
Let us first consider the virtues and vices of specific codification stat-
utes such as COGSA. The primary virtue of these statues is that the text of a 
particular treaty is written directly into the U.S. Code. When this act is 
done, there can be no debating whether international law has been well and 
truly incorporated into the law of the United States. It clearly has. The pri-
mary danger in adopting this particular approach is that a court called upon 
                                                                                                                           
 234 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 203 (addressing jurisdiction); id. § 207 (addressing right of action). 
 235 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (“[N]o court in the United States shall decline on the 
ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to 
the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is 
asserted . . . based upon . . . a confiscation or other taking . . . by an act of that state in violation of 
the principles of international law . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012) (discussing claims brought 
arising out of acts of torture, extrajudicial killings, aircraft sabotage, or hostage and specifying the 
application (or non-application) of such issues as sovereign immunity, the statutes of limitations, 
private rights of action, and property disposition). 
 236 See infra notes 238–255 and accompanying text.  
 237 See infra notes 256–291 and accompanying text. 
 238 F. Scott Boyd, Looking Glass Law: Legislation by Reference in the States, 68 LA. L. REV. 
1201, 1280 (2008). 
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to interpret the statute will fail to appreciate its international origins.239 In 
its INS v. Stevic,240 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted a spe-
cific codification statute in a manner that was wildly inconsistent with the 
international understanding of the original treaty text.241 In Couthino, Caro 
& Co. v. M/V Sava, the Fifth Circuit chose to interpret a different specific 
codification statute in light of “common law principles” rather than by look-
ing to the international understanding of the treaty language upon which the 
statute was based.242 When Congress chooses to codify specific treaty obli-
gations in domestic statutes, in other words, there is the danger that a U.S. 
court will ignore the fact that the statute is derived from a treaty and render 
an interpretation of the statute that is inconsistent with the original interna-
tional understanding of the text in question.243 
Where a statute incorporates a treaty by reference, this danger vanish-
es; the specific words contained in the treaty are never written into the stat-
ute. Instead, the statute merely incorporates the treaty by reference and di-
rects the reader to consult the treaty text. Since the text is set forth in only 
                                                                                                                           
 239 See Michael F. Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of 
Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT’L L. 729, 740 (1987) (“A court is more 
likely to follow the international understanding when it has the actual convention before it . . . and 
is more likely to diverge if the substance of the convention is embedded in a national code in 
which judges lose sight of its international nature.”); see also R v. Sec. of State for the Home 
Dep’t, ex parte Adan, [2001] 1 All E.R. 593, 617 (H.L.) (Steyn, L.J.) (U.K.) (observing that na-
tional courts must find the true interpretation of international law “untrammeled by notions of 
their national legal culture”). 
 240 467 U.S. 407, 407 (1984). 
 241 Id. at 412–13. The Court concluded that the “clear probability” standard rather than the 
“well-founded fear” standard should be applied in determining whether an alien was eligible for 
mandatory relief from deportation. Id. Scholars have generally been quite critical of that decision. 
See James C. Hathaway & Anne K. Cusick, Refugee Rights Are Not Negotiable, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 481, 523 (2000) (“There is . . . not an iota of historical support for the Supreme Court’s insist-
ence that the drafters wanted to limit Article 33 protection to the minority of refugees able to show 
a probability of persecution (rather than a well-founded fear of persecution).”); id. (“To the contra-
ry, the drafting record supports the view that the [‘life or freedom would be threatened’] language 
. . . was selected simply as a shorthand means of incorporating the refugee definition in Article 
1.”); Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-
Refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 123–24 (Erika 
Feller et al. eds., 2003) (“As a matter of the internal coherence of the Convention, the words 
‘where his life or freedom would be threatened’ in Article 33(1) must . . . be read to encompass 
territories in respect of which a refugee or asylum seeker has a ‘well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted.’ . . .”); Id. (“[T]here is little doubt that the words ‘where his life or freedom would be 
threatened’ must be construed to encompass the well-founded fear of persecution that is cardinal 
to the definition of ‘refugee’ in Article 1A(2) of the Convention.”); Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpret-
ing the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REV. 733, 746 (1998) (suggesting that “the Court never 
even attempted to discern whether its holding was a plausible construction of Article 33.1”);  
 242 849 F.2d 166, 168–71 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 243 In other cases, U.S. judges have stated (incorrectly) that treaties should be interpreted as 
though they are statutes. See, e.g., Cannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d 1190, 1192 (5th Cir. 
1992). 
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one place, there need be no concern that a court will misinterpret that text. 
Reference statutes, as it happens, pose an altogether different danger. In 
some cases, they make it easier for a court to ignore the treaty and to apply 
domestic law instead. 
The case law touching on Section 44(b) of the Lanham Act illustrates 
the potential for such an outcome. Section 44(b) is a general reference stat-
ute that incorporates an unspecified number of international treaties relating 
to the protection of trademarks and the repression of unfair competition. 
The statute provides that: 
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention 
or treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or 
the repression of unfair competition, to which the United States is 
also a party . . . shall be entitled to the benefits of this section un-
der the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give 
effect to any provision of such convention [or] treaty . . . in addi-
tion to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise enti-
tled by this Act.244 
As it so happens, the United States—along with virtually every other devel-
oped nation—is a party to the Paris Convention, a treaty that contains lan-
guage addressing the topic of unfair competition.245 In the views of many 
commentators, the protections afforded by the Paris Convention with re-
spect to unfair competition are more expansive than those otherwise availa-
ble under U.S. law.246 A straightforward reading of Section 44(b), therefore, 
would suggest that foreign individuals would be able to rely upon these ex-
pansive treaty rights—in addition to the rights otherwise available exclu-
sively under U.S. law—when involved in litigation in the United States.247 
In practice, however, U.S. courts have routinely declined to permit for-
eign litigants to invoke the treaty as an independent source of rights under 
                                                                                                                           
 244 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 245 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38 
IDEA 529, 530 (1998). 
 246 See, e.g., 4A RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS 
AND MONOPOLIES § 2610 (4th ed. 1994) (“Article 10bis [of the Paris Convention] is not premised 
upon the narrow meaning of ‘unfair competition’ as it was understood in American common law, 
but adopts the more liberal construction of the European countries such as France, Germany and 
Switzerland . . . .”). 
 247 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 687–90 (E.D. Mich. 
1996); Maison Lazard et Compagnie v. Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1286, 1288 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Patricia V. Norton, Note, The Effect of Article 10bis of the Paris Con-
vention on American Unfair Competition Law, 68 FORDHAM. L. REV. 225, 254 (1999) (urging the 
United States to “adopt Article 10 bis’s definition of unfair competition as the definition for all 
suits in the United States”). 
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Section 44(b).248 They have held instead that the Paris Convention guaran-
tees only that foreign nationals shall be entitled to national treatment—that 
is, precisely the same rights available to U.S. nationals under U.S. law (and 
no more). In justifying this conclusion, these courts have held that the Paris 
Convention does not set forth any “substantive rights” as they relate to un-
fair competition. This holding is difficult to square with Article 10 bis of the 
Paris Convention, which by its terms prohibits “all acts of such a nature as 
to create confusion by any means whatever with the establishment, the 
goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor.”249 Never-
theless, the overwhelming majority of federal courts to have considered the 
issue have concluded that the substantive protections against unfair compe-
tition set forth in the Paris Convention have no independent domestic effect, 
notwithstanding the “in addition to” language set forth in Article 44(b) of 
the Lanham Act.250 
In this case, the congressional decision to utilize a general reference 
statute arguably made it easier for U.S. courts to give effect to their underly-
ing (and often unstated) preference for applying domestic law rather than 
international law. The statute achieved this result by distancing the substan-
tive rules set forth in the treaty from the otherwise applicable substantive 
rules set forth in the wholly domestic Lanham Act. The primary danger in 
incorporating a treaty by reference, in short, is the risk that the treaty will be 
marginalized or disregarded by the court in favor of wholly-domestic rules 
because the text of the treaty was never formally been transcribed into do-
mestic legislation.251 
This problem of marginalization may be alleviated—through not en-
tirely eliminated—by utilizing a specific reference statute that refers to a 
single treaty. Rather than incorporating all U.S. treaties—or even a particu-
lar class of treaties, such as unfair competition treaties—this specific refer-
ence statute would direct the reader’s attention to the text of just one single 
treaty. Although there is still the risk that a court will disregard the treaty 
                                                                                                                           
 248 See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1956). 
 249 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis(3)(i), Mar. 20, 1883, 
13 U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, as last revised at Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 
21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 303.  
 250 See, e.g., Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 
2004); Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 628–29 
(4th Cir. 2003); International Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. 252 F.3d 1274, 
1277–78 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 251 At least one court has urged Congress to adopt legislation that spells out more precisely 
what provisions from the Paris Convention should be given effect by U.S. courts. See ITC Ltd. v. 
Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 164 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting “the absence of any statutory provision 
expressly incorporating . . . Articles 6bis [of the Paris Convention]” into U.S. law and urging 
Congress to enact legislation to express its intent with respect to this provision more clearly). 
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and apply domestic law instead, the very specificity of the legislative in-
structions—look at this treaty—makes this outcome less likely to occur.  
There are, however, at least two downsides to using specific reference 
statutes that refer to individual international agreements. First, their very 
specificity means that they can only be used to refer to treaties already in 
existence. In areas of the law where the United States enters into new trea-
ties with some frequency—tax, for example, or extradition—this particular 
drafting technique creates issues because it cannot easily account for trea-
ties entered into after the statute’s enactment. Second, where a treaty over-
laps to a significant extent with an existing body of statutory law, even a 
statutory provision that specifically invokes one particular treaty may not be 
enough to overcome the broad judicial preference for giving effect to do-
mestic law rules.252 
Each type of incorporative statute, in short, has its drawbacks. The 
danger presented by reference statutes is that the incorporated treaty will be 
ignored or otherwise marginalized. The danger presented by codification 
statutes is that the statute (and by extension the treaty) will be interpreted 
incorrectly. Since the issue of interpretation is a second-order problem—it 
will never arise if the court declines to apply international law in the first 
instance—then it follows that specific codification statutes should generally 
be preferred to general reference statutes. The choice between specific codi-
fication statutes and specific reference statutes is a closer call. If a treaty 
deals with an issue that is relatively self-contained, and if the legislation 
that incorporates the treaty into the U.S. Code is set forth in its own stand-
alone chapter, then the choice between the two drafting techniques likely 
will not matter overmuch.253 In these cases, the specific reference statute 
should generally be used to encourage interpretations consistent with those 
adopted by our treaty partners. In cases in which a treaty is incorporated by 
reference against the backdrop of an existing statutory framework, by con-
trast, then the risk that the treaty will go unenforced counsels in favor of 
writing the text of that treaty into the statute itself via a specific codification 
statute. 
In closing, it is useful to note that there are at least two means by 
which the problem of inconsistent interpretation posed by codification stat-
utes may be addressed. First, U.S. courts can (and sometimes do) seek to 
verify that their interpretation of these statutes is consistent with their read-
                                                                                                                           
252 Bederman, supra note 94, at 1487–88 (“[T]he farther removed treaties appear to judges as 
part of the national legal order, the more likely courts will defer or abstain in their application and 
interpretation.”). 
 253 The legislation that facilitates the implementation of the Hague Convention on Interna-
tional Child Abduction in the United States is a good example of this type of statute. See 22 
U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011 (2012 & Supp. 2014).  
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ing of the treaty text upon which the statute is based.254 Second, it is possi-
ble to address the problem of inconsistent interpretation via language con-
tained in the statute itself. Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, for example, 
which governs cross-border insolvencies, contains the following provision: 
“In interpreting this chapter, the court shall consider its international origin, 
and the need to promote an application of this chapter that is consistent with 
the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions.”255 In a 
similar vein, the legislation that facilitates the implementation of the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction provides 
that: “In enacting this chapter the Congress recognizes . . . the international 
character of the Convention; and . . . the need for uniform international in-
terpretation of the Convention.”256 If Congress were to include a similar 
reminder in other statutes that codify rules derived from international trea-
ties, then the likelihood that U.S. courts would adopt inconsistent interpreta-
tions of these statutes would be significantly reduced. 
2. Customary International Law 
In the context of customary international law, the question of what type 
of incorporative statute should be preferred presents a different set of ques-
tions. On the one hand, the meaning of statutes that refer to the “law of na-
tions” generally can evolve alongside the meaning of that law. Indeed, it 
was precisely this adaptability that enabled the venerable ATS—first enact-
ed in 1789 to address eighteenth-century problems—to be reimagined as a 
tool for promoting compliance with modern human rights law in the late 
1970s. On the other hand, codification statutes provide judges with clearer 
guidance as to the precise content of customary international law. In light of 
widespread judicial inexperience with customary international law, the im-
portance of such guidance should not be underestimated. 
As was the case in the treaty context, there are sound arguments in 
support of both types of statutes. On balance, however, the advantages that 
accrue to codification statutes in this context are arguably greater than the 
advantages that accrue to reference statutes. In order to understand the rea-
sons why this is so, let us compare the ATS, a general reference statute, to 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), a specific codification stat-
ute. 
The ATS, by its terms, provides that “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
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in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”257 At the 
time of its enactment, the ATS was apparently intended to provide redress 
for three specific torts—violation of safe conducts, infringements of the 
rights of ambassadors, and piracy.258 In 1980, however, the Second Circuit 
held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala that the ATS could be used by victims of 
human rights abuses committed “in violation of the law of nations” to seek 
damages from the perpetrators of these abuses.259 This decision ushered in 
an era in which U.S. courts were routinely called upon to determine whether 
certain acts did or did not violate the law of nations.260 Although this flexi-
bility served to expand dramatically the role of customary international law 
in U.S. courts, the decision to incorporate customary international law only 
by reference posed a great many questions for which there were not always 
easy answers.261 Does murder qualify as a violation of the law of nations?262 
Torture? 263  Assisting in the production of chemical weapons? 264  War 
crimes?265 Forced labor?266 Child rape?267 Drug trafficking?268 Medical ex-
perimentation without the consent of the subject?269 Extensive damage to 
the environment?270 The answers to these (and other) questions concerning 
the scope and application of customary international law were not always 
clear. 
When the First Congress enacted the ATS, moreover, it declined to en-
act any supplementary provisions that would facilitate its domestic applica-
tion by courts. In the absence of such provisions, the task of determining 
whether the ATS created a private right of action, whether it contained an 
exhaustion of local remedies requirement, or whether it applied extraterrito-
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rially fell to judges.271 On the one hand, the fact that the text was so sparse 
gave judges a great deal of freedom to shape the contours of ATS litigation 
without interference from the other branches of government.272 On the other 
hand, the lack of textual guidance means that U.S. courts have long pos-
sessed—and continued to possess—the ability to scale back or end alto-
gether the practice of litigation under the ATS. The tradeoff struck between 
judicial flexibility and legal certainty, in other words, favored judicial flexi-
bility. 
A very different tradeoff was struck with the enactment of the FSIA in 
1976.273 The FSIA—which sought to codify the existing body of customary 
international law rules relating to sovereign immunity—prioritized legal 
certainty over judicial flexibility.274 The Act contains a detailed definition 
of what constitutes a “foreign state,” a clear statement that such states are 
immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, and a list of exceptions to this 
general rule.275 The fact that these rules are all set forth in a statute means 
that FSIA is easier for judges to administer than is the ATS. It also means 
that it is unlikely that the courts will take it upon themselves to dramatically 
expand (or contract) the scope of the customary international law of foreign 
sovereign immunity.  
The downside, of course, is that this codification of customary rules 
“freezes” them in a particular moment in time. Scholars have criticized the 
law of sovereign immunity in the United States on the grounds that the 
FSIA no longer reflects the prevailing customary law of sovereign immuni-
ty as it has evolved over the past 40 years.276 Scholars have levied similar 
complaints at the Death on the High Seas Act, which provides that “[w]hen 
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the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default oc-
curring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the Unit-
ed States, the personal representative of the decedent may bring a civil ac-
tion in admiralty against the person or vessel responsible.”277 When this 
statute was enacted in 1920, customary international law stipulated that a 
state’s sovereignty over its territorial waters extended three miles from its 
shores. Accordingly, Congress wrote that rule into the statute. Over the past 
century, however, the customary rule changed. Today, the rule is that a 
state’s territorial waters extend twelve miles from its shores.278 The statute, 
however, has not been updated to reflect these developments and some U.S. 
courts have applied the older rule (three miles) even as they acknowledged 
that the existence of modern rule (twelve miles) because the older rule is the 
one that was originally codified in the statute.279 
The danger of “freezing” customary rules in time notwithstanding, a 
strong case can be made that the specific codification statute exemplified by 
the FSIA represents a more sustainable model than the general reference 
statute exemplified by the ATS. Although both statutes have undeniably 
expanded the role played by international law in the U.S. legal system, the 
success of the ATS in achieving this goal was attributable in large part to 
serendipity. In the late 1970s, a unique constellation of interests—including 
human rights advocates, federal judges, and sympathetic officials in the ex-
ecutive branch—decided to use the then-moribund ATS as a tool of promot-
ing human rights law amid the diplomatic pressures of the Cold War.280 In 
the early years, the primary defendants named in suits under the ATS were 
individuals who were often incapable of paying the judgments entered 
against them.281 This allowed the modern incarnation of the ATS to gain 
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significant traction in the U.S. legal system.282 When the focus of the litiga-
tion later turned to corporations, the ATS was too well established to be eas-
ily cast aside. Had the original set of defendants in ATS suits been corpora-
tions accused of aiding and abetting human rights abuses rather than indi-
viduals who actually committed those abuses, it is far from clear that ATS 
doctrine would have proceeded along the same doctrinal path.283 
None of which is to minimize the impact of the ATS in enhancing the 
prominence of international law in domestic litigation; its impact in this 
area has been dramatic and undeniable.284 Rather, it is to convey how easily 
things could have turned out differently given the open-ended nature of the 
statutory text. Notwithstanding its many successes, therefore, it is difficult 
to argue that the ATS represents a prototype upon which other incorporative 
statutes should be modeled. Instead, a specific codification statute modeled 
after the FSIA—replete with clear definitions, a careful distillation of the 
substantive rules of customary international law, and additional provisions 
explaining its intended scope of domestic application—seems better calcu-
lated to ensure that judges consistently give effect to customary internation-
al law rules. 
As it so happens, there has been at least one attempt to “codify” the 
ATS.285 In 2005, Senator Diane Feinstein proposed a bill—the Alien Tort 
Statute Reform Act—that would have amended the ATS so as to make it 
more closely resemble the FSIA. The proposed legislation would have re-
moved the language referring to torts “committed in violation of the law of 
nations” and replaced it with language specifically authorizing “claim[s] of 
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torture, extrajudicial killing, genocide, piracy, slavery, or slave trading.”286 
The precise meaning of each of these terms was exhaustively defined in the 
proposed legislation.287 This legislation would have directly addressed such 
issues as the exhaustion of local remedies and the statute of limitations.288 It 
also would have made clear that a defendant could not be held liable under 
the statute unless he or she was a “direct participant acting with specific 
intent to commit the alleged tort.”289 This latter provision would likely have 
made it difficult—if not impossible—to sue corporations for violating the 
ATS because such claims are typically based on a theory that corporations 
have “aided and abetted” others in their actions.290 
This legislative proposal was opposed by many human rights groups 
that chose to forego the certainty that would have come with the proposed 
legislation in order to retain the flexibility afforded by the current ATS. The 
legislation was never voted on by the Senate and never became law.291 In 
concept, however, it seems clear that the enactment of something resem-
bling this reform legislation—as modified to strike a different balance be-
tween the various stakeholders in the debate—would put the ATS on a 
sounder legislative footing. Such legislation would also arguably make it 
easier for judges to administer the statute and would remove altogether the 
possibility that the Supreme Court might someday choose to bring the era of 
ATS litigation to a close. 
CONCLUSION 
At the end of the day, recent history and practice suggest that U.S. 
courts are most likely to give effect to international law in situations in 
which that law has been written into a statute. To the extent that some 
scholars have argued that it is preferable for U.S. judges to give effect to 
self-executing treaties and customary international law directly, these argu-
ments have foundered on the rocks of attitudes and inexperience. If the goal 
is to enhance the role played by international law in the U.S. legal system, 
that law should be written into the U.S. Code to the greatest extent possible.  
In closing, it should be emphasized that this Article does not argue that 
international law should never be given direct effect in the United States in 
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the absence of a statute. Such law has long been—and should continue to 
be—directly enforced by U.S. courts in appropriate cases. Nor does this 
Article suggest that U.S. courts should treat all treaties as non-self-
executing or that they should never directly enforce customary international 
law. This Article simply argues that that if the goal is to reverse the present 
judicial retreat from international law—and to give international law a more 
prominent role in the U.S. legal system—there are a number of compelling 
reasons to believe that appeals to the political branches to enact legislation 
that writes this law into the U.S. Code are more likely to achieve this goal 
than continued attempts to persuade U.S. judges to reform their doctrine, 
rethink their attitudes, and reacquaint themselves with the basics of interna-
tional law. 
